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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case we are required to decide the 
constitutionality of several provisions of an ordinance 
enacted by the city of Akron, Ohio, to regulate the 
performance of abortions. Today we also review abortion 
regulations enacted by the State of Missouri, see Planned 
A SSo (...' c,; - il "- o~ ~ ~ t ~ 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Ashcroft, u.s. 
(1983), and the State of Virginia, see Simopoulos v. 
Virginia, u.s. (1983). 
I 
2. 
In February 1978 the city council of Akron enacted 
Ordinance Number 160-1978, entitled "Regulation of 
Abortions." The ordinance was prefaced by several 
findings:of Lb9 g~ty SQYnsi~ that Akron's citizens are 
entitled to the highest standard of health care; that 
abortion is a major surgical procedure and that the 
pregnant woman's health must be protected; that abortions 
should be performed only in certain hospital facilities; 
that an unborn child is a human life from the time of 
conception; that a physician should not have an adversary 
relationship towards the unborn child; and that physicians 
are obligated to work toward the survival of a viable 
unborn child. 1 
.s 
The ordinance g.gesz:R t.() set"' forth 
1 "WHEREAS, the citizens of Akron are entitled to 
the highest standard of health care; and 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
seventeen provisions that regulate the performance of 
WHEREAS, abortion is a major surgical procedure which 
can result in complications, and adequate equipment and 
personnel should be required for its safe performance in 
order to insure the highest standards of care for the 
protection of the life and health of the pregnant woman: 
and 
WHEREAS, abortion should be performed only in a hospital 
or in such other special outpatient facility offering the 
maximum safeguards to the life and health of the pregnant 
woman: and 
WHEREAS, it is the finding of Council that there is no 
point in time between the union of sperm and egg, or at 
least the blastocyst stage and the birth of the infant at 
which point we can say the unborn child is not a human 
life, and that the changes occurring between implantation, 
a six-weeks embryo, a six-month fetus, and a one-week-old 
child, or a mature adult are merely stages of development 
and maturation: and 
WHEREAS, traditionally the physician has been 
responsible for the welfare of both the pregnant woman and 
her unborn child, and that while situations of conflict 
may arise between a pregnant woman's health interests and 
the welfare of her unborn child, the resolution of such 
conflicts by inducing abortion in no way implies that the 
physician has an adversary relationship towards the unborn 
child: and 
WHEREAS, Council therefore wishes to affirm that the 
destruction of the unborn child is not the primary purpose 
of abortion and that consequently Council recognizes a 
continuing obligation on the part of the physician towards 
the survival of a viable unborn child where this 
obligation can be discharged without additional hazard to 
the health of the pregnant woman: and 
WHEREAS, Counci 1, after extensive public hearings and 
investigations concludes that enactment of this ordinance 
is a reasonable and prudent action which will 
significantly contribute to the preservation of the public 
life, health, safety, morals, and welfare." Ordinance 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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t-fle~e ~rov-isioiT'S are directly at issue in 
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~L ~~ jluP0 ybk; 
( i) Section 1870.03 requires that all abortions 
~ 
~he ~trimester of pregnancy be performed 
performed in a hospital. 2 
(ii) Section 1870.05 sets forth requirements for 
notification of and consent by parents prior to the 
performance of abortions on minors. 3 
160-178. 
2"1870.03 ABORTION IN HOSPITAL 
No person shall perform or induce 
pregnant woman subsequent to the 
trimester of her pregnancy, unless 
performed in a hospital." 
an abortion upon a 
end of the first 
such abortion is 
Section 1870.l(b) defines "hospital" as "a general 
hospital or special hospital devoted to gynecology or 
obstetrics which is accredited by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals or by the American Osteopathic 
Association." 
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages. 
5. 
(iii) Section 1870.06 requires the attending 
physician to make a series of statements to the patient 
"to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly 
informed consent." 4 
3 "1870.05 NOTICE AND CONSENT 
(A) No physician shall perform or induce an abortion 
upon an unmarried pregnant woman under the age of 18 years 
without first having given at least twenty-four (24) hours 
actual notice to one of the parents or the legal guardian 
of the minor pregnant woman as to the intention to perform 
such abortion, or if such parent or guardian cannot be 
reached after a reasonable effort to find him or her, 
without first having given at least seventy-two (72) hours 
constructive notice to one of the parents or the legal 
guardian of the minor pregnant woman by certified mail to 
the last known address of one of the parents or guardian, 
computed from the time of mailing, unless the abortion is 
ordered by a court having jurisdiction over such minor 
pregnant woman. 
(B) No physician shall perform or induce an abortion 
upon a minor pregnant woman under the age of fifteen (15) 
years without first having obtained the informed written 
consent of the minor pregnant woman in accordance with 
Section 1870.06 of this Chapter, and 
(1) First having obtained the informed written 
consent of one of her parents or her legal guardian in 
accordance with Section 1870.06 of this Chapter, or 
(2) The minor pregnant woman first having obtained an 
order from a court having jurisdiction over her that the 
abortion be performed or induced." 
4 "1870.6 INFORMED CONSENT 
(A) An abortion otherwise permitted by law shall be 
Footnote continued on next page. 
6. 
(iv) Section 1870.07 requires a twenty-four hour 
performed or induced only with the informed written 
consent of the pregnant woman, and one of her parents or 
her legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance 
with Section 1870.05(b) of this Chapter, given freely and 
without coercion. 
(B) In order to insure that the consent for an abortion 
is truly informed consent, an abortion shall be performed 
or induced upon a pregnant woman only after she, and one 
of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is 
required in accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of this 
Chapter, have been orally informed by her attending 
physician of the following facts, and have signed a 
consent form acknowledging that she, and the parent or 
legal guardian where applicable, have been informed as 
follows: 
(1) That according to the best judgment of the 
attending physician she is pregnant. 
(2) The number of weeks elapsed from the 
time of conception of her unborn child, based 
information provided by her as to the time of 
menstrual period of after a history and 





(3) That the unborn child is a human life from the 
moment of conception and that there has been described in 
detail the anatomical and physiological characteristics of 
the particular unborn child at the gestational point of 
development at which time the abortion is to be performed, 
including, but not limited to, appearance, mobility, 
tactile sensitivity, including pain, perception or 
response, brain and heart function, the presence of 
internal organs and the presence of external members. 
(4) That her unborn child may be viable, and thus 
capable of surviving outside of her womb, if more than 
twenty-one (22) weeks have elapsed from the time of 
conception, and that her attending physician has a legal 
obligation to take all reasonable steps to preserve the 
life and health of her viable unborn child during the 
abortion. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
7. 
waiting period between the time the woman signs a consent 
(5) That abortion is a major surgical procedure, 
which can result in serious complications, including 
hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual 
disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in 
subsequent pregnancies~ and that abortion may leave 
essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing 
psychological problems she may have, and can result in 
severe emotional disturbances. 
(6) That numerous public and private agencies and 
services are available to provide her with birth control 
information, and that her physician will provide her with 
a list of such agencies and the services available if she 
so requests. 
(7) That numerous public and private agencies and 
services are available to assist her during pregnancy and 
after the birth of her child, if she chooses not to have 
the abortion, whether she wishes to keep her child or 
place him or her for adoption, and that her physician will 
provide her with a list of such agencies and the services 
available if she so requests. 
(C) At the same time the attending physician provides 
the information required by paragraph (B) of this Section, 
he shall, at least orally, inform the pregnant woman, and 
one of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is 
required in accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of this 
Chapter, of the particular risks associated with her own 
pregnancy and the abortion technique to be employed 
including providing her with at least a general 
description of the medical instruct ions to be followed 
subsequent to the abortion in order to insure her safe 
recovery, and shall in addition provide her with such 
other information which in his own medical judgment is 
relevant to her decision as to whether to have an abortion 
or carry her pregnancy to term. 
(D) The attending physician performing or inducing the 
abortion shall provide the pregnant woman, or one of her 
parents or legal guardian signing the consent form where 
applicable, with a duplicate copy of the consent form 
Footnote continued on next page. 
B. 
---form and the time the abortion is performe~ --
' 
(v) Section 1870.16 requires that fetal remains be 
"disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner." 6 
A violation of any section of the ordinance is 
punishable as a criminal misdemeanor. 7 If any provision 
signed by her, and one of her parents or her legal 
guardian where applicable, in accordance with paragraph 
(B) of this Section." 
5 "1870.07 WAITING PERIOD 
No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a 
pregnant woman until twenty-four (24) hours have elapsed 
from the time the pregnant woman, and one of her parents 
or her legal guardian whose consent is required in 
accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, have 
signed the consent form required by Section 1870.06 of 
this Chapter, and the physician so certifies in writing 
that such time has elapsed." 
6"1870.16 DISPOSAL OF REMAINS 
Any physician who shall perform or induce an abortion 
upon a pregnant woman shall insure that the remains of the 
unborn child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary 
manner." 
7"1870.18 PENALTY 
(A) Whoever violates Sections 1870.02, 1870.03, 1870.04, 
1870.05, 1870.06, 1870.07, 1870.08, 1870.10, 1870.14, 
1870.15 or 1870.17 of this Chapter shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor of the first degree and punished as 
provided for in Section 698.02 of the Codified Ordinances 
Footnote continued on next page. 
9. 
is invalidated, it is to be severed from the remainder of 
the ordinance. 8 The effective date of the ordinance was 
May 1, 1978. 
On April 19, 1978, a lawsuit challenging virtually 
all of the provisions of the ordinance was filed in the 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The 
plaintiffs, ~ respondents and cross-petitioners in 
this Court, were three corporations that operate abortion 
clinics in Akron and a physician who has performed 
of the City of Akron, Ohio, 1975. 
(B) Whoever violates any other provision of this Chapter 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor of the third 
degree and punished as provided for in Section 698.02 of 
the Codified Ordinances of the City of Akron, Ohio, 1975." 
8 "1870.19 SEVERABILITY 
Should any provision of this Chapter be construed by any 
court of law to be invalid, illegal, unconstitutional, or 
otherwise unenforcible, such invalidity, illegality, 
unconstitutionality, or unenforcibili ty shall not extend 
to any other provision or provisions of this Chapter." 
10. 
~ .£;,~~'r 
abortions at one of the clinic~ The defendants,~~a~ 
petitioners and cross-respondents here, were the city of 
~ ~l 'S) , 
Akron and three city officials. Two individuals were 
A: 
permitted to intervene as co-defendants "in their 
individual capacity as parents of unmarried daughters of 
(&· ' 
child-bearing age." On April 27, 
1\ 
') , 
1978, the District Court 
preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the ordinance. 
In August 1979 the District Court ruled on the 
merits. 479 F. Supp. 1172 (ND Ohio 1979). It found that 
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge seven provisions 
l 
(.4,.., 
of the ordinance, none of which ~e before this Court. 
~
The District Court ruled that four provisions ~ 
~ J 
~JmconstL~uti~~, including §1870.05 (parental notice and 
consent), §1870.06(8) (requiring disclosure of facts 
concerning the woman's pregnancy, fetal development, the 
11. 
complications of abortion, and agencies available to 
assist the woman), and §1870.16 (disposal of fetal 
remains). The court upheld the constitutionality of the 
remainder of the ordinance, including §1870.03 
(hospitalization for post-first-trimester abortions), 
§1870.06(C) (requiring disclosure of the particular risks 
of the woman's pregancy and the abortion technique to be 
employed), and and §1870.07 (twenty-four hour waiting 
period). 
All parties appealed some portion of the District 
Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 651 F.2d 
1198 (CA6 1981). It affirmed the District Court's 
decision that §1870.03's hospitalization requirement is 
constitutional. It also affirmed the ruling that 
12. 
§§1870.05, 1870.06(B), and §1870.16 are unconstitutional. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's 
decision on §§1870.05(C) and §1870.07, finding these 
provisions to be unconstitutional. 
Three separate petitions for certiorari were filed. 
. . . 'ff d ~ We granted the pet1t1ons of the pla1nt1 s an  
~, ___ u.s. ___ (1982). We denied the petition of 
the defendant-intervenors, u.s. (1982) , though they 
are entitled to participate in this Court as respondents. 
We now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
upholding Akron's hospitalization requirement, but affirm 
the remainder of the G:o\Ht 13-£ Ap~8alB"" decision 
invalidating the parental consent, informed consent, 
waiting period, and fetal remains disposal provisions. 
13. 
l ) ---In Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113 (1973), this Court held 
that the "right of privacy, ..• founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restriction 
upon state action, is broad enough to encompass a woman's 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id., 
at 153. is a 
medical procedure, the full vindication of the woman's 
fundamental right requires that her physician be given 
"the room he needs to make his best medical judgment." 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). See Whalen v. 
Roe, 429 u.s. 589, 604-605 n. 33 (1977). The physician's 
exercise of this medical judgment necessarily encompasses 
both assisting the woman in the decisionmaking process and 
implementing her decision should she choose abortion. See 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 u.s. 379, 387 (1979). 
fundamental right "is not unqualified and must be 
considered against important state interests in abortion." 
~~ ~ ~ ,C;x_ trl-
Roe, 410 U.S., at 154. ButAa-ftY State ,\i~t:::;:;e with 
~ 
the right to choose abortion, as with ~ fundamental 
"' . 
)cA./ ~ 4¥.4 ...... ~.-<~ . 
rights subject to ~£~t judicial &erut~y, see, e.g., 
" 
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 
686, 688 {1977), must be justified by ~m~ ? 
intere~and "narrowly drawn to express only the 
legitimate state interests at stake," Roe, 410 U.S., at 
155. We have recognized two such eom!'e-1-!-i~~e-
interests that may justify State regulation of abortions. 9 
~ ~ 
9The Court~ has recognized~hat, in view of the 
unique status of children under the law, the States have a 
"significant" interest in certain abortion regulations 
aimed at protecting children "that is not present in the 
case of an adult." Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri 
Footnote continued on next page. 
. "' 
15. 
First, a State has an "important and legitimate 
interest in protecting the potentiality of human life." 
Id., at 162. Although this interest exists "throughout 
the course of the woman's pregnancy," Beal v. Doe, 432 
v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 52, 74-75 (1976). See Carey v . 
Po~ulation Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 693, n.lS 
(1 77) (plurality opinion). The right of privacy means 
"independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions," Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977), 
this Court, and the law generally, has regarded minors 
as less capable than adults of making such important 
decisions. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-635 
(1979) (plurality op1n1on) (Bellotti II); Danforth, supra, 
at 102 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Accordingly, we have held that the States have a 
legitimate interest in encouraging parental involvement in 
the abortion decision of their minor children. See H.L. 
v. Matheson, 450 u.s. 398 (1981) (parental notice); 
Bellott1 II, supra, at 639, 648 (plurality opinion) 
(parental consent). A majority of the Court, however, has 
indicated that these State and parental interests must 
give way to the constitutional right of a mature minor or 
of an immature minor whose best interests are contrary to 
parental involvement. See, e.g., Matheson, supra, at 420 
(POWELL, J., concurring); id., at 450-451 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting). A State choosing to encourage parental 
involvement must a± a m1R1~ provide an alternative 
procedure through which a minor may demonstrate that she 
is mature enough to make her own decision or that the 
abortion is in her best interest. See Bellotti II, supra, 
at 633-635 (plurality opinion). 
~- dtt> ~~ ~~ ~£/u!_~ 




U.S. 438, 445-446 (1977), W"' baue ~<Jftir>eit lh"'t ~ 
becomes compelling only at viablity, the point at which 
the fetus "has the capability of meaningful life outside 
the mother's womb," Roe, 410 u.s., at 163. See Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
At viability this~ interest is so 
~t 
important that the /tate may ~1!1-late-crbo~~H@~g~p~r~ef'l~t~t!"cC1!"i! 
r.~~~~~~ 
Athe pot~ti~l life of the unborn child and, ifidSQd, evefi>--' 
proscribe abortions altogether, "except when it is 
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." 
Roe, 410 u.s., at 164. 
Second, since a State has a legitimate concern with 
the health of women who undergo abortions, "a State may 
properly assert important interests in safeguarding health 
[and] in maintaining medical standards." Id., at 154. In 
17. 
Roe we held, however, that this health interest does not 
become compelling until 11 approximately the end of the 
first trimester 11 of pregnancy ... 10 Ibid. Until that time, 
/l..-1-~~ ( I.M-~ 
10The first-trimester point was chosen J beca~JP ?- unt~ ' 
that time--according to the · medical literature~atlTb7.,.!:.ue 
S"M--+~ i-n 1:9 +3-- 11mortality in abortion may be less than mortality 
in normal childbirth... Roe, 410 u--.s., at 163. There is 
~~~ .evidence that developments in the past decade; _f 
~particularly the development of a much safer method for ~ 
performing second-trimester abortions, see infra at , ~~· 
extended the period in which abortions are safer than 
childbirth. See, e.g., Cates, et al., Mortality from 
Abortion and Childbirth, 248 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 188, 191 
• 
(1982) (abortion may be safer than childbirth up to 
gestation~ ::J- 6 w ks 
We ..... ' owever' to retain Roe Is 
identification o!b~~b beginning of the second trimester as 
the approximate ~at which it becomes compelling for 
the State to regulate in the interest of maternal health. 
The Roe trimester standard continues to provide a 
reasonable legal benchmark for limiting the State's 
authority to enact health regulations, for the medical 
• evidence suggests that 4ntil approximately the end of the 
first trimester, the State's interest in maternal health 
would not be served by restricting the manner in which 
abort ions are per formed by a 1 icensed physic ian. See, 
e.g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 
1982) (abortions generally may be performed in a 
physician's office or an outpatient clinic up to 14 weeks 
from the first day of the last menstrual period); 
Technical Bulletin of the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, No. 56 (Dec. 1979) 
(
11 Regardless of advances in abortion technology, mid-
trimester terminations will likely remain more hazardous, 
Footnote continued on next page . 
18. 
a pregnant women must be permitted, in consultation with 
her physician, to decide to have an abortion and to 
effectuate that decision "free of interference by the 
State. nll Id., at 163. 
This does not mean that a State never may enact a 
expensive, and emotionally disturbing for women than 
earlier abortions"}. Where the State adopts a health 
regulation governing the performance of abortions during 
the second trimester, the determinative question should be 
whether there is a reasonable medical basis for the 
regulation, see Roe, supra, at 163, not whether it happens 
to apply to some abortions that may be safer than 
childbirth. Of course, where the State employs a health 
rationale as a justification for a complete prohibition on 
abortions in certain circumstances, the comparison between 
abortion and childbirth mortality rates may still be 
relevant. See Danforth, 428 u.s., at 78-79 (invalidating 
State ban on saline abortions, a method that was "safer, 
with respect to maternal mortality, than even continuation 
of the pregnancy until normal childbirth"}. 
11of course, the State retains an interest in 
ensuring the validity of Roe's factual assumption that 
"the first trimester abortion [is] as safe for the woman 
as normal childbirth at term," an assumption that "holds 
true only if the abortion is performed by medically 
competent personnel under conditions insuring maximum 
safety for the woman." Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 
9, 11 (1975}. On th1s bas1s, for example, it is 
permissible for the States to impose criminal sanctions on 
the performance of an abortion by a nonphysician. Ibid. 
19. 
regulation touching on the woman's abortion right during 
the first weeks of pregnancy. Certain4~~f~~ 
~~~~ 
~inimis burdens on the woman's exercise of her f~ndamental 
right may be permissible where justified by important fl 
~I; 
State health objectives. In Danforth, supra, we upheld 
" 
two Missouri statutory provisions, applicable to the first 
trimester, requiring the woman to provide her informed 
written consent to the abortion and the physician to keep 
certain records, even though comparable requirements were 
not imposed on most other medical procedures. See 428 
U.S., at 65-67, 79-81. The decisive factor was that the 
State met its burden of demonstrating that these 
~urthered important health-related State 
concerns. 12 Yet e•Jen ....i-~ose-~m-staHces tl~ s Ld"LU"toty~ 
Footnote{s) 12 will appear on following pages. 
w.L ./t4~~~~~ 
~ We empfi«sige that even minimal ~tr~ieRs . ~n Efle 
I\ 
20. 
~~~~ ~  A abortion procedure ~~the first trimester may notAebstFUct 
~ ~~4~1-
~~a~J~IIe~a~n+i~n~9~f~tlN~ physician-patient consultation or see~~o ~~~-
A , ~ -7-~ 
d.~ -kh.,..,~.~ ~~" ~  ~ 
influence t~f the woman's ~. ~ 
1\ 
From approximately the end of the first trimester of 
pregnancy, the State "may regulate the abortion procedure 
to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to 
the preservation of maternal health." 13 Roe, 410 U.S., at 
12For example, we concluded that recordkeeping, "if 
not abused or overdone, can be useful to the State's 
interest in protecting the health of its female citizens, 
and may be a resource that is relevant to decisions 
involving medical experience and judgment." 428 u.s., at 
81. See infra at (discussing the State's interest in 
requiring informed consent). 
13 "Examples of permissible state regulation in this 
area are requirements as to the qualifications of the 
person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licens~ 
of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure 
is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital 
or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-
Footnote continued on next page. 
21. 
163. The State's discretion to regulate on this basis 
does not, however, permit it to adopt abortion regulations 
that depart from sound medical practice. We have rejected 
a State's attempt to ban a particular second-trimester 
abortion procedure, where the ban would have increased the 
~I-t>~ 
costs of abortion without~c9nfe{E~por taA~ health 
~~p-~~~ 
benefits in return . thereey limit~ the availability of 
A 
~ abortions and fore~ some women to undergo the possibly 
greater health risks of childbirth. Danforth, 428 u.s., 
~ .;S 
at 77-78. ~a State 0 Inaertakes t~~equire licensinq _or 
./' £..- ... ~ 
t,.Hc#k•• /-a...A1-..._ h i/i4 ~ 
~ regulate the performance of abortion~uring this 
1\ . 1ft' ~ 
period, l~~ mtlst be aQ!Q to ~rovide 
~ · 
standards adopted ~'~egitimately 
1\ ~ 
~Fee£ tha~ the health 
(_J 
relate)l' to the 
1"'\ 
hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and 
the like." Roe, 410 u.s., at 163-164. 
22. 
objective the State seeks to accomplish." ~, 410 u.s., 
~~ ~L: ---..... 
at 195. 1\ ;r&e State may l'I:A unreasonably ( interfer3 with the 
"woman's right to receive medical care in accordance with 
her licensed physician's best judgment." Id., at 197. 
III 
Section 1870.03 of the Akron ordinance requires that 
any abortion performed "upon a pregnant woman subsequent 
to the end of the first trimester of her pregnancy" 14 must 
be "performed in a hospital." A "hospital" is "a general 
14The Akron ordinance does not define 11 first 
trimester, 11 but elsewhere suggests that the age of the 
fetus should be measured from the date of conception. See 
§1870.06(B) (1) (physician must inform woman of the number 
of weeks elapsed since conception); §1870.06(B) (4) 
(physician must inform woman that a fetus may be viable 
after 22 weeks from conception). Such a method differs 
from the normal practice of computing the weeks of 
gestation from the date of the last menstrual period. 
Under the latter method, the first trimester iasls =ttnti~ 
the end of 12 weeks gestation. In this pinion all 
references to gestational age are based on the formQr 
method unless otherwise indicated. ~
23 . 
hospital or special hospital devoted to gynecology or 
obstetrics which is accredited by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals or by the American Osteopathic 
Association." §1870.l{B). Since accreditation by these 
organizations requires compliance with comprehensive 
standards governing a wide variety of health and surgical 
services, 15 the effect of the ordinance is to prevent the 
performance of abortions in outpatient facilities that are 
not part of an acute-care hospita1. 16 
15The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals 
{JCAH), for example, has guidelines relating to such 
things as dietetic services, emergency services, home care 
services, nuclear medicine services, pharmaceutical 
services, professional library services, rehabilitation 
programs and services, social work services, and special 
care services. See generally JCAH, Accreditation Manual 
for Hospitals 1983 Edition {1982). 
16Akron' s ordinance carefully distinguishes between 
"hospitals" and outpatient clinics. Section 1870.02 
provides that even first-trimester abortions must be 
performed in "a hospital or an abortion facility." 
"Abortion facility" is defined as "a clinic, physician's 
Footnote continued on next page. 
24. 
In the District Court plaintiffs sought to 
demonstrate that this hospitalization requirement has a 
serious detrimental impact on a woman's ability to obtain 
a second-trimester abortion in Akron and that it is not 
reasonably related to the State's interest in the health 
of the pregnant woman. The District Court did not reject 
this argument, but rather found the evidence "not so 
convincing that it is willing to discard the Supreme 
Court's formulation in Roe" of a clear line between 
impermissible first-trimester regulation and permissible 
second-trimester regulation. 479 F. Supp., at 1215. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed on a similar basis. It was 
persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that a hospitalization 
office, or any other place or facility in which abortions 
are performed, other than a hospital." §1870.0l(G). 
25 . 
requirement did not have a reasonable health justification 
for at least part of the second trimester, but it declined 
to "retreat from the 'bright line' in Roe v. Wade." 651 
17 F.2d, at 1210. We believe that the courts below 
~ ~~~~.) 
misinterpreted~ prior flOleings, and we now hold that 
-'\. 1\ 
§1870.03 is unconstitutional. 
A 
~~ 
In Roe v. Wade we held that after the end of the 
"\ 
.,.. R!0 f ~4 '~6 .e a :a:io'i • 
17The Court of Appeals~believed that it was bound by 
Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services, Inc. v. Bowen, 
496 F. Supp. 894 (ND Ind. 1980) (three-judge court), aff 1 d 
sub nom. Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services, Inc. v. 
Orr, 451 u.s. 931 (1981), in which an Indiana second-
trlmester hospitalization requirement was upheld. We note 
that the statute at issue there, in sharp contrast to the 
Akron ordinance, defined hospitals to include ambulatory 
outpatient surgical centers. More importan t4 the District 
Court in that case stated an alternative gr~und for its 
holding. See 496 F. Supp., at 902-903. Our summary 
affirmance therfore may not be viewed as precedent on the 
hospitalization issue. See Illinois State Board of 
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180-
181, 182-183 (1979). 
26. 
first trimester of pregnancy "a State may regulate the 
abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation 
reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of 
maternal health." 410 u.s., at 163. One example given of 
permissible regulation was requirements "as to the 
facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that 
is, whether it must be in a hospital or may be a clinic or 
some other place of less-than-hospital status." Ibid. 
1--tu.~ 
In the companion case of Doe v. Bolton we invalidated 
1\ 
a Georgia requirement that all abortions "be performed in 
a hospital licensed by the State Board of Health and 
accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Hospitals." 410 u.s., at 203. We observed that the JCAH 
accreditation process "has to do with hospital standards 
generally and has no present particularized concern with 
27 . 
abortion as a medical or surgical procedure." Id., at 
193. This ~4eu~er accreditation requirement therefore 
could not ><Wl&tand caniD:il;ytjnn.alf ;::L4:-::!: ~ 
~~~,, 
'based on differences that are reasonablv related to the 
~ -
purposes of the Act in which it is found.'" Ibid. 
(quoting Morey v. Doud, 354 u.s. 457, 465 (1957)). 
~~~~~ 
W~ ~~ned ~Georgia's requirement that all 
abortions be performed in a licensed hospital. 
W-<._ 
'Altheu-gh 
recogniz~ the State's legitimate health interests in 
"" 
establishing, for second-trimester abortions, "standards 
for licensing all facilities where abortions may be 
W..-L~,~I 
performed," id., at 195 ,. we state-d that "the State must 
"' 
show more than it has in order to prove that only the full 
resources of a licensed hospital, rather than those of 
some other appropriately licensed institution, satisfy 
28. 
~4~~~ 
these health interests." Ibid. { We conclude~ that the 
;:::: a_~~ 1-~ ~ 
hospital requirement~-s-±_-n_n-;_i!tl-;:.-±,...·~-;_~1i~ ;;?i}JJea tol ~ 
H> --~~.y . c::=: 
t\. first-trimester abortion~~ 
Doe ~s left open the possibility that the State 
could prove that such a requirement was valid if limited 
to post-first-trimester abortions. At the same time, ~ 
'-
/~~~~~~~~~ j inlii~ehat w-e wQ;a;Q Ret~~e €~accept uncritically 
~ry)u-~ 
a State's view as to the need for a~~;ratto~ §~=:~
. --
This was confirmed ~ ~ &ecisieA in Planned Parenthood 
of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
Missouri sought to ban saline amniocentesis abortions on 
the basis of evidence that an alternative second-trimester 
~~~ 
abortion method was safer. .we-I\ invalidated t l~b e an because 
the State had failed to account for the widespread medical 
l 
29. 
use of the saline method and because the alternative 
method was not widely available. 428 u.s., at 77-79. 
In light of these decisions, we think it clear that 
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals erred in 
believing that Roe's "'bright line,'" 651 F.2d, at 1210, 
precludes a finding that certain State abortion 
regulations may be perm~ssible only in part of the second 
trimester. The "bright line" established in Roe -- that a 
State's interest in health regulation becomes compelling 
at approximately the end of the first trimester --
identifies the point at which the State may be entitled to 
enact significant regulations governing the performance of 
abortions. The existence of a compelling State interest 
in health, however, is only the beginning of the inquiry. 
The State still must demonstrate that its regulation is 
designed to further that State interest. 
reasonableness of 
that a court, in ~ .. ~1t e 
1\ 
vz_.u.v 
must ~t the 
risks of abortion and the interests of the 
unvarying throughout the entire second trimester. 
30. 
~ 'firJ L.lie, 
:fmay not impose unreasonable regulations during part of the 
second trimester on the ground that they are reasonable 
---?- ~.e:_,u~~ 
for another part. 
limit the effect 
Rather, the State has an obligation~to ~ 
·JA_ ~ 4..~~ 
of ~ regulations to theAetme in the ~ 
.... .. 
pregnancy during which its health interest reasonably will 
be furthered. 
B 
There can be no doubt that §1870.03's second-
trimester hospitalization requirement places a significant 
31. 
~~~H.L~e;j 
~ !J~ ,it, 4~ 
obstacle in the path of womenl\seekiftg an abortion. A 
primary burden created by the requirement is additional 
cost to the woman. The Court of Appeals noted that there 
was testimony that a second-trimester abortion costs more 
than twice as much in a hospital as in a clinic. See 651 
F.2d, at 1209 (in-hospital abortion costs $850-$900, 
whereas a "dilatation and evacuation" (D&E) abortion 
performed in a clinic costs $350-$400) • 18 Moreover, the 
court indicated that second-trimester hospital abortions 
were largely unavailable in Akron. Only two hospitals had 
18National statistics indicate a similar cost 
difference. In 1978 the average clinic charged $284 for a 
D&E abortion, while the average hospital charge was $435. 
The hospital charge did not include the physician's fee, 
which ran as high as $300. See Rosoff, The Availability 
of Second Trimester Abortion Services in the United 
States, Second Trimester Abortion: Perspectives After a 
Decade of Experience 35 (Berger, Brenner & Keith eds. 
1981) (hereinafter Second Trimester Abortion) • 
32 . 
performed any second-trimester abortions, and during the 
year prior to trial only nine such abortions had been 
performed in them. Ibid. 19 Thus, a second-trimester 
hospitalization requirement may force women to travel to 
find available facilities, resulting in both financial 
expense and additional health risk, 20 and i~ t aet may 
19The Akron situation is not unique. In many areas 
of this country, few, if any, hospitals perform second-
trimester abortions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687 (CAS 1981) 
(second-trimester dilatation and evacuation abortions 
available at only one hospital in Missouri); Margaret S. 
v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 192 (ED La. 1980) (no 
hospitals in Louisiana perform abortions after first 
trimester); Wolfe v. Stumbo, C80-025859L(A), slip op. at 2 
(WD Ky. Dec. 3, 1980) (no elective post-first trimester 
abortion performed in Kentucky hospitals). See generally 
Henshaw, Forrest, Sullivan & Tietze, Abortion Services in 
the United States, 14 Family Planning Perspectives, at 
Table 12, 6, 17 (1982) (of all non-Catholic general 
hospitals, only about one in ten offers any second-
trimester abortions). 
20The Court of Appeals found that the lack of 
facilities to per form second-trimester abort ions already 
impedes the abi 1 i ty of women to obtain second-trimester 
abortions in Akron. Many women were referred by Akron 
clinics to clinics in Cleveland or in Michigan. See 651 
F.2d, at 1208. Req~4ng &Rat ~l second-t~im9ste~ __ 
Footnote continued on next page. ~ 
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prevent some women from obtaining a 
abortion a~1. 21 It therefore is a 
second-trimester 
21 rn those States permitting post-twelve week 
abortions to be performed at outpatient facilities, a 
greater number of second-trimester abortions are performed 
than in those States that require hospitalization. See 
u.s. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Center for 
Disease Control Abortion Surveillance, August 1978, Table 
12, at 33 (hereinafter 1978 Center for Disease Control) 
(proportion of abortions past twelve weeks of gestation is 
33% lower on the average in States with hospitalization 
requirements than in the States without them). This fact 
suggests that, in the typical State with restrictions, 
many women who might be expected to need mid-trimester 
abortions are either not obtaining them or are traveling 
to other States for these services. 
22The impact may be greatest on minors, who are more 
likely than adult women to have their abortions performed 
after the first trimester. See 1978 Center for Disease 
Control, supra n. , at Table 15. Not only must minors 
face the burdens that generally result from a 
hospitalization requirement, but they also are more likely 
to need parental permission to enter a hospital to obtain 
abortions than they are to obtain abortions in clinics. 
See Torres, et al., Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and 
Adolescents' Use of Family Planning and Abortion Services, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
34. 
Akron does not contend that §1870.03 imposes only an 
insignificant burden on women's access to abortion, but 
rather defends it as a reasonable health regulation. This 
position had strong support at the time of Roe v. Wade, as 
hospitalization for second-trimester abortions was 
recommended by the American Public Health Association 
(APHA), see Roe, 410 U.S., at 143-146, and the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) , see 
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecololgic Services (4th ed. 
1974). Since then, however, the safety of second-
trimester abortions has increased dramatically. 23 The 
12 Family Planning Perspectives 284, 286 (1980). 
23The death to case ~~or all second-trimester 
abortions in this country fell from 14.4 deaths per 
100,000 abortions in 1972 to 7.6 per 100,000 in 1977. See 
Tyler, et al., Second Trimester Induced Abortion in the 
United States, Second Trimester Abortion, supra n. , at 
17-20. 
~ f+0Dif'! 
9-Ar~ +e . 
~ 
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principal reason is that the "dilatation and evacuation" 
~~~.a-t.. {.~ 
(D&E) procedure ~een !lSQd successfully )fOr second-
. t b t. 24 tr1mes er a or 1ons. The Court of Appeals found that 
there was "an abundance of evidence that D&E is the safest 
method of performing post-first trimester abortions 
today." 651 F.2d, at 1209. 25 The availability of the D&E 
24There are three basic medical techniques for 
performing second-trimester abort ions. The most common 
technique is D&E, which entails dilation of the woman's 
cervix and removal of the fetus vaginally by means of 
suction and instruments. A second method~s to induce 
labor and expulsion of the fetus through ~ intrauterine 
instillation of saline solution or prostaglandins. The 
third method, now rarely used because of its high risk, is 
hysterotomy, which involves a surgical incision through 
the abdominal wall and uterus, and manual removal of the 
fetus. See Grimes & Cates, Dilatation and Evacuation, 
Second Trimester Abortion, supra n. , at 119-120. At the 
time Roe was decided, the D&E procedure was used to 
perfor~first-trimester abortions, but was considered 
unsafe to use after the twelfth week of gestation. 
25A 1977 study conducted by the Joint Program for 
the Study of Abortion, now under the auspices of the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control, found that the relative risk 
of sustaining one or more major complications was 2. 6 
times higher with saline instillation than with D&E, even 
after adjusting for such factors as gestational age, 
patient age, and level of operator training. See Cates & 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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~wv6~ 
procedure during the interval between twelve and sixteen 
1\ 
weeks gestation, the former "grey area" in which second-
trimester abortions could not be performed, 26 has meant 
that women desiring a second-trimester abortion no longer 
are forced to incur the health risks of that substantial 
period of delay. 
For our purposes, an even more significant factor is 
that experience indicates that D&E may be performed safely 
Grimes, Morbidity & Mortality, Second Trimester Abortion, 
supra n. , at 168. 
The D&E method is safer because it entails vaginal 
evacuation of the fetus using surgical instruments, is 
direct and rapid, and avoids the "uncertain induction of 
prolonged labor and the systemic side effects of the two 
instillation methods." See Grimes, et al., Methods of 
Midtrimester Abortion: Which is Safest?, 15 Int '1 J. 
Gynecol. Obstet. 184, 187 (1977). 
26 rnstillation procedures, the primary alternative 
means of performing a second-trimester abortion, cannot be 
, ......... L~ _don-e- until approximately ...t-m:r the sixteenth week of 
r~rv·-- ~ pregnancy because until that time the amniotic sac is too 
small. See Cates, et al., The Effect of Delay and Method 
Choice on the Risk of Abortion Morbidity, 9 Family 
Planning Perspectives 266, 268 (1977). 
37 . 
~ 
on an outpatient basis in 1\ nonhospi tal facilities. 27 The 
evidence is strong enough to have convinced the APHA to 
abandon its prior recommendation of hospitalization for 
all second-trimester abortions: 
Current data show that abortions occurring 
in the second trimester can be safely performed 
by the Dilatation and Evacuation (D and E) 
procedure .... Requirements that all abortions 
after 12 weeks of gestation be performed in 
hospitals increase the expense and inconvenie~ 
27 A -H~aj 9i? f'eaeoft" ±-5- that The D&E techniqu 
entail the labor that is required with abortion induced 
through an instillation method. In a dition, 
hospitalization may not enhance the safety D&E 
abortions because a major cause of complicat ens--
infection--does not arise until 24 to 72 hours afte the 
procedure has taken place, by which time the woman will 
have been discharged from either a hospital or a clinic. 
See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Ashcroft, 
664 F.2d 687, 690 n.6 (CAS 1981). 
A study by the Department of Health, Education & 
Welfare determined that operator skill is the critical 
factor in predicting the risks to the health of women who 
undergo abortions. This is because infection results from 
failure to evacuate completely the uterus. See Cates & 
Grimes, Deaths from Second Trimester Abortion by 
Dilatation and Evacuation: Causes Prevention, Facilities, 
58 Obstet. & Gynecol. 401, Table 1 (1981). On the basis 
of this HEW finding, the APHA has concluded that non-
hospital facilities may well be safer because of the 
extensive abortion experience of physicians in clinics. 
See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 195 n.40 (ED 
La. 1980). 
to the woman without contributing to the safety 
of the procedure. 
APHA Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services 
(Revised 1979), 70 Am. J. Public Health 652, 654 (1980) 
38. 
(hereinafter APHA Recommended Guide). Similarly, the ACOG 
no longer suggests that all second-trimester abortions be 
performed in a hospital. It recommends that abortions 
performed in a physician's office or outpatient clinic be 
limited to fourteen weeks gestation, but it indicates that 
abortions may be performed safely in "a hospital-based or 
in a free-standing ambulatory facility, or in an 
outpatient clinic meeting the criteria required for a 
free-standing surgical facility" until eighteen weeks 
gestation. American College of Obstetricians and 
1 
,• 
lfp/ss 01/28/83 Rider A, p. 39 (Akron) 
~ 
These developments, and the professional commentry 
1\ 
supporting them, constitute impressive evidence that!\ at 
least during the 1~weeks of the second trimeste~; D&E 
abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic 
as in a hospita1. 28 We conclude, therefore, that "present 
medical knowledge," Roe, 410 u.s., at 163, convincingly 
undercuts Akron's justification for requiring that all -
second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital. 29 
We hold that §1870.03 unconstitutionally infringes the right 
of a woman ~with advice of a physician~have an 
) / 




Gynecologists, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) ~ ~ 
,1+--;o.., ~~~~·---k &b"~~ 
~ These developments constitute impressive evidence J I 
II 
that, at least during the first weeks of the second 
trimester, D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an 
-,;A e. W--<--
t t . t 1' . . h . t 1 28 ~ :I: I: . t t ou pa 1en c 1n1c as 1n a osp1 a .na y rmpo-r an 
~/~~~ 
is tsat th:i:s "present medical knowledge," Roe, 410 u.s., 
~.,4~ 
at 163, convinc fn~~t~ Akron's justification for 
28see also Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687, 690 n.6 (CAS 1981) (discussing 
testimony by Dr. Willard Cates, Chief of Federal Abortion 
Surveillance for the National Centers of Disease Control, 
that D&E second-trimester abortions are as safely 
performed outside of hospitals from thirteen to fifteen 
weeks); APHA Recommended Guide, supra, at 652, 654 (out-
patient D&E is safer than all in-hospital non-D&E abortion 
procedures during the second trimester); Cates and Grimes, 
"Deaths from Second Trimester Abortion by Dilatation and 
Evacuation: Causes, Prevention, Facilities," 58 Obstetrics 
& Gynecology 401 (1981) (study of the eighteen deaths 
resulting from D&E abort ions in the seven-year interval 
between 1972 and 1978 revealed no higher incidence of 
deaths in nonhospital setting). 
~H-L-~£-r 
..,A,~~--~ 
~.~A... p&-....e. ..... ~r:;c..,c~r..c. 
t&S-B~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Hr~~~ 
rP:c~a~n~ be perfo ed 
.1\ W..~:-~~ 5 IF7o.~.3 
hospital. 29 -----
juetify its ~eir"'£-show:i::'Rg taat, ~spect to D&L 
29The revised position of the ACOG did not occur 
until after trial in thi . 
pas president of ACOG who 
--=---learly established'" t 
could orrned L-~ 
that the 0 ontinued 
41. 
"only the full resources of a licensed 
hospital, rather than those of some other appropriat ly 
Doe, 410 u.s., at 195. 
~ Akron nonetheless urges that "[t]he fact that some 
mid-trimester abortions may be done in a minimally 
equipped clinic does not invalidate the regulat~' 
Reply Brief at 19. The city thus implies that its 
hospital requirement may~ be sustained because it is 
reasonable as applied to later D&E abortions or to all 
second-trimester instillation abortions. 30 We cannot 
~· 
~t 
1P~~, 1 )()/ ~~ 30 rt is clear that D&E abortions are much safer than 
vy _ 7 instillation abortions, see n. supra, and the evidence 
~ · ~~ 
1
i-/ before us concerning the need for hospitalization concerns 
~- -~ ~ only the D&E method. See 651 F.2d, at 1208-1210; Planned 
~-~ Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687, 
~~Y, 688-690 (CA8 1981}. At least some authorities believe 
~y:~ that other second-trimester procedures should be performed 
J,..l ~ in hospitals. See, e.g., Cates & Grimes, Morbidity and 
~~- .~ Footnote continued on next page. 






agree. It is true that a State abortion regulation is not 
unconstitutional simply because it does not perfectly 
correspond to the asserted State interest. But the lines 
drawn in a State regulation must be reasonable, and this 
cannot be said of the city of Akron's requirement that all 
second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospita1. 31 
Mortaility, Second Trimester Abortions, supra n. , at 163-
178; Second Trimester Abortion: A Symposium by 
Correspondence, 16 J. Reprod. Med. 47, 55-56 (1976) 
(recommending that all amnio-infusions be performed in 
hospitals). We express no view on whether it would be 
reasonable for a State to mandate that all such abortions 
be performed in a general hospital. 
31As noted above, Akron defines "hospital" as a 
hospital accredited by the JCAH or the American 
Osteopathic Association. §1870.0l(B). The city has not 
provided a rationale for using accreditation as the 
standard, though we assume the city's intent was to 
confine abortions to full-scale hospitals. In Doe v. ? 
Bolton, we indicated that a State reasonably might adopt 
licensing standards for abortion facilities, but we 
rejected JCAH accreditation as a reasonable standard. We , 
found that provision of the comprehensive services related 
to JCAH accreditation simply had nothing to do with the 
standards that a State legitimately might establish for 
the performance of abortions. See 410, at 193-194. Akron 
.-------;-:--:-1r-m~ nat pl:.!)llj de.Q aRY reason for retreating from our 
in Doe. Thus, we note that Akron's use of JCAH or 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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By preventing the performance of D&E abortions in a 
nonhospital setting, Akron has imposed a heavy, and 
entirely unnecessary, burden on women's access to a 
relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe 
abortion procedure. 32 Section 1870.03 "has the effect of 
inhibiting •.• the vast majority of abortions after the 
first 12 weeks," Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976), and therefore violates 
the Constitution. 
-IV ) 6 
American Osteopathic Association accreditation to define 
"hospital" is an additional flaw in its ordinance. 
32 In the United States during 1981, 82.1% of all 
early second-trimester abortions (13-15 weeks) and 54% of 
all second-trimester abortions from 13-20 weeks were 
performed by the D&E method. See 1978 Center for Disease 
Control, supra n. , at Table 14; Cates & Grimes, Deaths 
from Second Trimester Abortion by Dilatation and 
Evacuation: Causes, Prevention and Facilities, 58 




We turn next to Akron's parental consent requirement, 
§1870.05(B), which provides: 
"(B) No physician shall perform or induce an 
abortion upon a minor pregnant woman under the 
age of fifteen (15) years without first having 
obtained the informed written consent of the 
minor pregnant woman in accordance with Section 
1870.06 of this Chapter, and 
(1) First having obtained the informed 
written consent of one of her parents or her 
legal guardian in accordance with Section 
1870.06 of this Chapter, or 
(2) The minor pregnant woman first having 
obtained an order from a court having 
jurisdiction over her that the abortion be 
performed or induced." 
The District Court invalidated this provision because "it 
does not establish a procedure by which a minor can avoid 
a parental veto of her abortion decision by demonstrating 
that her decision is, in fact, informed. Rather, it 
requires, in all cases, both the minor's informed consent 
and either parental consent or a court order." 479 F. 
Supp., at 1201. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the 
45. 
same basis. 33 
The relevant legal standards are not in dispute. The 
Court has held that "the State may not impose a blanket 
provision requiring the consent of a parent or person 
33For essentially the same reasons, the District 
Court held that §1870.05(A)'s parental notification 
requirement was unconstitutional. 479 F. Supp., at 1202. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. Relying on H.L. v. 
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), the court held that 
subsection (A) "is a constitutionally permissible 
regulation insofar as it applies to immature minors who 
li eir parents, are dependent upon them and are 
not emancipat by marriage or otherwise." 651 F.2d, at 
1206. The court · to decide 
the validity of statute to a mature or 
emancipated minor since neither the plaintiffs (abortion 
clinics and a physician) nor the defendant-intervenors 
(parents of minor females) represented the interests of 
such persons. 
This conclusion seems anomalous, given that the Court 
of Appeals ruled at the same time that §1870.05(B) 's 
parental consent requirement was unconstitutional because 
it did not establish a procedure by which a mature or 
emancipated minor could obtain an abortion without 
obtaining another party's consent. If the plaintiffs and 
defendant-intervenors did not represent the interests of 
mature minors for purposes of parental notice, it is 
difficult to see why they nonetheless could raise those 
interests in challenging the facial constitutionality of 
the parental consent provision. In any event, plaintiffs 
did not seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision on 
the parental notification provision, and the issue 
therefore is not before the Court. 
46. 
in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an 
unmarried minor." Danforth, 428 U.S., at 74. In Bellotti 
v. Baird, 443 u.s. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II), a majority of 
the Court indicated that a State's interest in protecting 
immature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent 
substitute, either parental or judicial. See id., at 640-
642 {plurality opinion for four Justices); id., at 656-657 
(WHITE, J., dissenting) (expressing approval of absolute 
parental or judicial consent requirement). See also 
7 
• Danforth, 428 U.S., at 102-105 {STEVENS, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). The Bellotti II plurality 
cautioned, however, that the State at a minimum must 
n'- provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor 
may demonstrate that she is suffciently mature to make the 
abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, 
47. 
an abortion would be in her best interests. 443 u.s., at 
643-644. 
Under these decisions, it is clear that Akron may not 
make a blanket determination that all minors under the age 
# / fc;z..;..;. #' .t" c 6vt f z;:o;;L/~1 () ------.:..._ 
of fifteen 
r~ claims that the courts below erroneously assumed 
that the alternative procedure required in Bellotti II 
could not be provided under Ohio law. 34 Akron relies on 
34Plaintiffs assert that the Court of Appeals' 
holding as to §1870.05(B) is not properly before the 
Court. They point out that the District Court's ruling 
that §1870.05(B) was unconstitutional was appealed not by 
the city, but by the defendant-intervenors. In 
plaintiffs' view, Akron therefore is foreclosed from 
raising the issue in this Court. Even in that event, the 
issue normally could be raised by defendant-interevenors, 
who are respondents here under this Court's Rule 19.6. 
But plaintiffs now challenge defendant-intervenors' 
s anding appeal the parental consent issue to the Court 
of Appeals, thoygh J:.hey dj d. noL rais.e th4s CR-allenge 
below. Plaintiffs state that since intervenors did not 
allege that their daughters were pregnant or likely to 
become pregnant or to seek an abortion in Akron, they 
lacked standing to appeal. This would mean that the 
parental consent issue was not properly before the Court 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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H.L. v. Matheson, 450 u.s. 298 (1981), in which a pregnant 
of Appeals. Plaintiffs therefore request that we dismiss 
the writ of certiorari on this issue. 
We believe the issue properly is before the Court. 
It is true that a party who acquiesces in an adverse 
judgment by a district court may not raise that issue on a 
petition for a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals, 
where other affected parties have not sought review of the 
decision below. See O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing 
Center, 447 u.s. 773, 783 n.l4 (1980). In this case Akron 
noticed an appeal from the District Court's judgment, but 
apparently failed to raise the parental consent issue in 
its brief in the Court of Appeals. Yet there is no doubt 
that Akron had an interest in defending §1870.05(B) and in 
seeking to overturn the decision below, and it may be 
assumed that Akron's failure to brief the issue 
represented a decision to reduce its workload by leaving 
the parental consent issue to the defendant-intervenors. 
The more important point is that the record does not 
indicate that Akron actually acquiesced in the judgment of 
the District Court. Akron argued on behalf of §1870.05(B) 
in the Court of Appeals, without apparent objection by 
either the court or the opposing parties. See Tr. Oral 
Argument at 8-9, 50. 
Given this uncertain record, as well as the lack of 
any discussion of these issues in the court below, we 
cannot say that the parental consent issue was not 
properly before the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, Akron 
may seek review of it in this Court. We note that, 
"although we would not normally allow a party to make an 
argument it had not raised below, the fact that the same 
argument was vigorously asserted by [defendant-
intervenors] and fully addressed by the Court of Appeals 
removes any prudential barrier to review that might 
otherwise exist." O'Bannon, supra, at 783 n.l4. We 
therefore express no view as to whether defendant-
intervenors would have had constitutional standing to 
appeal the District Court's decision if the city of Akron 
had refused to contest that decision. 
• ·~-= an _s s *hi<-- A+<, 4-d..L..,,~""lAA.-.. ~ 
~~~  49. 
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~ --t:;~, 
/h.L- /1-hz_.,~ .. ..., ~ ~ ~ , Pu..f HcrL; 
~~~if~~~ 
minor ~Utah's abortion consent requirement on 
the ground that it impermissibly applied to mature or 
emancipated minors. plaintiff 
lacked standing to raj she had not 
alleged that she or a ss was mature or 
emancipated. 450 U.f noted that this 
c mported with the prudential rule ha~ a federal court 
should avoid ~ a constitutional ruling where an 
unconstrued state statute is suscep 'ble of a construction 
by the state judiciary that would void S£ a, ~er the 
onstitutional problem . 
...._:___--- ' 
eeoaus""e the 
physician plaintiff, who is subject to potential criminal 
liability for failure to comply with the requirements of 
§1870.05(B), has standing to raise the claims of his minor 
' 
50. 
patients. See Danforth, 428 u.s., at 62; Doe v. Bolton, 
410 u.s., at 188-189; Bellotti II, 443 u.s., at 627 n.S 
(plurarity opinion • Nor do we think that the courts 
below erred in refusing to abstain from deciding the 
constitutionality of the consent requirement. It may be 
reasona~e to assume, as we did in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 
uis . I, supra, and Matheson, supra, that a state court 
presented with a statute specifically governing abortion 
consent proceedings for pregnant minors will attempt to 
construe the statute consistently with constitutional 
~0 requirements. See also Planned Parenthood of CeRLt al 
Missou~ v. Ashcroft, post, at (upholding Missouri 
statute governing minors' abortions where reasonable 
construction is consistent with constitutional 
requirements). But this case is quite different. As part 
51. 
of a city ordinance, §1870.05(B) does not create any 
judicial procedures for making the necessary 
determinations. Akron instead asserts that the Ohio 
Juvenile Court will serve as a "court having jurisdiction" 
to make the proper determination of maturity. But the 
Ohio statute governing juvenile proceedings does not 
mention minors' abortions at all, and nothing in the 
statute remotely suggests that the Ohio Juvenile Court has 
authority to inquire into a minor's maturity or 
emancipation. 35 In these circumstances, we do not think 
35The Ohio Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over any 
child "alleged to be a juvenile traffic offender, 
delinquent, unruly, abused, neglected, or dependent." 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2151.23. The only category that 
arguably could encompass a pregnant minor desiring an 
abortion would be the "neglected" child category. A 
neglected child is defined as one "[w]hose parents, 
guardian or custodian neglects or refuses to provide him 
with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical 
or surgical care, or other care necessary for his health, 
morals, or well being." §2151.03. Even assuming that the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
52. 
that the Akron ordinance, as applied in Ohio juvenile 
proceedings, is reasonably susceptible of being construed 
to create an "opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of 
the maturity of pregnant minors." Bellotti II, 443 U.S., 
at 643 n.23. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' 
judgment that §1870.05(B) is unconstitutional. 
Ohio courts would construe these provi ons as permitting 
a minor to obtain judicial approval or the "proper or 
necessary .•. medical or surgical c re" of an abortion, 
where her parents had refused to pr vide that care, the 
statute ~~i~e clearly makes no provi ion for a mature or 
emancipated minor compl9~9ly to avoid parental involvement. 
5 ~ ~ b;z: G9mens.t.~~ ~ t~af.act..i.oa Q.f.... tHola -cnurt that she 
is capable of exercising her constitutional right to 
choose an abortion. On the contrary, the statute requires 
that the minor's parents be notified once a petition has 
been filed, §2151.28, a requirement that in the case of a 
mature minor seeking an abortion would be 
unconstitutional. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 420 
(1981) (POWELL, J., concurring); id., at 4 28 n.3 





The Akron ordinance provides that no abortion shall 
be performed except "with the informed written consent of 
the pregnant woman, ••. given freely and without 
coercion." §l870.06(A). Furthermore, "in order to insure 
that the consent for an abortion is truly informed 
consent," the woman must be "orally informed by her 
attending physician" Of liHWeral faotlii reJtil.tiRf:t=b-9 the 
status of her pregnancy, the development of her fetus, the 
date of possible viability, the physical and emotional 
complications that may result from an abortion, and the 
availability of agenices to provide her with assistance 
and information with respect to birth control, adoption, 
.5 ..e...L.-
and childbirth. §1870.06(B). In addition, the attending 
physician must inform her "of the particular risks 
associated with her own pregnancy and the abortion 
54. 
technique to be employed ...• " and other information 
"which in his own medical judgment is relevant to her 
decision as to whether to have an abortion or carry her 
pregnancy to term." §1870.06(C). 
The District Court found that §1870.06(B) was 
unconstitutional, but that §l870.06(C) was related to a 
valid state interest in maternal health. See 479 F. 
Supp., at 1203-1204. The Court of Appeals concluded that 
both provisions were unconstitutional. See 651 F.2d, at 
1207. We affirm. 
A 
In Danforth, supra, we upheld a Missouri law 
requiring a pregnant woman to "certif[y] in writing her 
consent to the abortion and that her consent is informed 
and freely given and is not the result of coercion." 428 
u.s., at 85. We noted that "[t]he decision to abort, 
indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it 
.,;E a -
is eesi~ble aAd imperative that it be made with full 
c:i!e.. 
knowledge of its nature and consequences. The woman is 
the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of the 
decision and its significance may be assured, 
constitutionally, by the State to the extent of requiring 
her prior written consent." Id., at 67. We rejected the 
view that "informed consent" was too vague a term, 
construing it narrowly to mean "the giving of information 
to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its 
consequences. To ascribe more meaning than this might 
well confine the attending physician in an undesired and 
uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his 
profession." Id., at 67 n.8. 
56. 
Ir--4-s---:i-mpert·eurt to ~cegnb.:~ that~ validity of the 
Jet ts 
informed consent requirement rested on the State's 
interest 
(I 
~4f'a"' "_. .t..-A-·1~ ~/-.L. ' 
in protecting the health of the pregnant woman 
" 
and regulating the sound practice of medicine. A State 
~ H..-LA..-~~  ·J/f~~~ 
has a legit.ima-t:.G .it:l~t iR ..enl3J~g that persons who T 
A. 
submit to a surgical procedure do so freely and with 
~~~.,f-,L.~~~ 
knowledge of thet{r~ . we f01.md IW 
~f-~~~~~~ 
consti tnH.L)nal-..QHfie-Ylty \ii:e-A a se-et~' s applisation e h 
performed in the 
authority to decide what information a women must be given 




physician,~ to dec~wl:lat GGRiiii9e-l'-a~n-s H e re"levafi't- to 
thet aeci~~. Danforth merely recognized e na r row 
~ 
1\ State's 
abOt'tion ohoiee belen~s t~ the woman, aftd=the Mate• s y 
J~terest in protecting,~ealth will not justify 
abortion regulations designed to influence her personal 
choice as between abortion or childbirth. 36 
36we have not held that a State always is foreclosed 
from asserting an interest in whether pregnancies end in 
abortion or childbirth. In Maher v. Roe, 432 u.s. 464 
(1977), and Harris v. McRae, 448 u.s-.-297 (1980), we 
upheld governmental spending statutes that reimbursed 
indigent women for childbirth but not abortion. This 
legislation to further an interest in preferring 
childbirth over abortion was permissible, however, only 
because it did not add "any restriction on access to 
abortion that was not already there." Maher, 432 u.s., at 
474. We also have determined that a State's interest in 
protecting immature minors and in promoting family 
integrity gives it a special interest in ensuring that the 
abortion decision is mad~e after careful deliberation. 





Viewed in this light, we believe that §1870.06(B) 
attempts to extend the State's interest in ensuring 
"informed consent" ~ beyond permissible limits. 
___.:P 
r 
Initi~t~~ear that much of the information 
that m~~ eQ a~~d bears little relationship to a 
legitimate State regulatory interest in health. The 
requirement that the physician inform his patient that 
"the unborn child is a human life from the moment of 
conception," §1870.06(B) (3), u~ql:lestio~ai;Hy is an attempt 
See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981); 
id., at 419-420 (POWELL, J., concurring); id., at 421-424 
(STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment. ---
. · ze, how , 
imited and narrow exceptions to the basic 
he abortion decision is for the woman to make. 
~--~~~·terate that a State does not have a legitimate interes 
in attempting to regulate the performance of abortions i 
a manner designed to influence the woman's decision as t 
hether to abort her regnancy. 
59. 
to persuade the woman to forego having an abortion. In 
Roe v. Wade we refused to permit a State to prohibit 
abortions based on the State's theory that life began at 
conception, see 410 u.s., at 159-162, and a State is no~ 
~ free to require that a women consider that theory 
prior to having an abortion. Nor is there any 
justification for requiring a detailed description of "the 
anatomical and physiological characteristics of the 
particular unborn child," §1870.06(B) (3), or requiring 
that the woman be informed that her unborn child may be 
viable after twenty-two weeks have elapsed from conception 
and that "her attending physician has a legal obligation 
to take all reasonable steps to preserve the life and 
health of her viable unborn child during the abortion." 
§1870.06(B) (4). Such information is relevant, if at 
60. 
a11, 37 only to the woman's personal choice, and it 
therefore is beyond the State's regulatory power. 38 
Even the one portion of §1870.06(B) addressed 
directly to the health risks of an abortion, subsection 
(5), seems designed primarily to convince the patient to 
37Much of the information required in subsections 
(3) and (4) is quite controversial. The District Court 
found, for example, that "there was much evidence that it 
is impossible to determine many of the items [of which] 
the physician is required to inform the patient by part 
(3) of subsection (B), such as the 'unborn child's' 
sensitivity to pain." 479 F. Supp, at 1203. The 
controversiali ty of the information is not the basis of 
our holding, but it does demonstrate further that the 
city's goal is to influence the woman's decision by 
requiring that she listen to a perspective that is likely 
to suggest a decision for childbirth over abortion. 
38The other subsections of this provision require 
that the patient be informed of the fact that she is 
pregnant, §1870.06(B) (1), the gestational age of the 
fetus, §1870.06(B) (2), and the availability of agencies 
and services to provide information on birth control and 
adoption and assistance during pregnancy and after 
childbirth, §§1870.06(B) (6), (7). Though this information 
is considerably less inflammatory than that required in 
subsections (3), (4), and (5), it still seems more 
relevant to the personal aspects of the woman's abortion 
decision than to her appreciation of the health risks of 
undergoing an abortion. 
61. 
forego having an abortion. The phsyician is instructed to 
inform the patient 
"That abortion is a major surgical procedure 
which can result in serious complications, 
including hemorrhage, perforated uterus, 
infection, menstrual disturbances, sterility and 
miscarriage and prematurity in subsequent 
pregnancies; and that abortion may leave 
essentially unaffected or may worsen any 
existing psychological problems she may have, 
and can result in severe emotional 
disturbances." 
Plaintiffs have contended, and the District Court found, 
that some of this information is at least exaggerated or 
misleading, if not false. 39 This alone would provide 
justification for preventing the State from requiring its 
disclosure. 
39The District Court found, for example, that "there 
was much evidence that rather than being 
procedure' as the physician is required 
abortion generally is considered a 
procedure.'" 479 F. Supp., at 1203. 
'a major surgical 
to state ••• , an 
'minor surgical 
62. 
The more fundamental problem with this subsection, 
however, and indeed with all of §l870.06(B), is that the 
physician is required to make specific statements to his 
patient regardless of whether he believes that the 
information is relevant to her particular decision. For 
example, even if the physician believes that some of the 
risks outlined in subsection (5) are nonexistent for a 
particular patient, he remains under an obligation to 
describe them to her. This is precisely the type of 
"undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket" that the 
Danforth Court warned should not be imposed on the 
physician. 428 U.S., at 67 n. 8. If the physician must 
recite a State-created list of health risks and other 
putatively relevant facts, his patient's ability to obtain 
the particular information she needs to make her abortion 
63. 
decision may well be impeded. A State may not place such 
"obstacles in the path of the doctor upon whom [the woman 
is] entitled to rely for advice in connection with her 
decision." Whalen v. Roe, 429 u.s. 589, 604 n. 33 (1977). 
This flaw requires invalidation of §1870.06(B) in its 
entirety. We reiterate that a State's interest in 
ascertaining that the woman has given her informed consent 
to an abortion is only a narrow one that is limited to 
ensuring disclosure of the health risks that the physician 
reasonably believes are relevant to the pregnant woman's 
decision. "Informed consent" is not a rubric under which 
a State may attempt to provide the woman with all 
information that the State views as relevant to her 
decision. We of course do not suggest that the State is 
foreclosed from attempting to publicize useful information 
64. 
such as the availability of adoption services. But the 
tate may not do so by way of an expanded "informed 
requirement, as this interferes unacceptably with 
the woman's ability to make her personal abortion 
decision. 
c 
Section 1870.06(C} presents a~ different 
question. Under this provision, the "attending physician" 
must inform the woman 
"of the particular risks associated with her own 
pregnancy and the abortion technique to be 
employed including providing her with at least a 
general description of the medical instructions 
to be followed subsequent to the abortion in 
order to insure her safe recovery, and shall in 
addition provide her with such other information 
which in his own medical judgment is relevant to 
her decision as to whether to have an abortion 
or carry her pregnancy to term." 
The information required by ~R~ ~ovi~ien clearly is 
related to maternal health and to the State's legitimate 
65. 
purpose in requiring informed consent. 
Court of Appeals determined that 
physician's medical judgment "in he same way as 
section 1870.06(B). It requires to make 
certain disclosures in all cases, regardles of his own 
professional 
651 F.2d, at 
"informed consent" to mean "the giving 
the patient as to just what would be done and as to its 
consequences." 428 u.s., at 67 n. 8. We see no 
significant difference in Akron's requirement that the 
woman be told of the particular risks of her pregnancy and 
the abortion technique to be used and be given general 
instructions on proper post-abortion care. Moreover , 
66. 
a,_~~~~ 
,spe..cH-i:-e 9cts..~s Hi subsection (B), §1870.06 (C) merely 
describes the general type of information to be disclosed 
and properly leaves the precise nature and amount of this 
disclosure to the physician's discretion and exercise of 
with our concern that the physician be given 
·nformation best suited to the particular needs of the 
The Court of Appeals also held, however, that 
§1870.06(C) was invalid because it required that the 
disclosure be made by the "attending physician." 40 The 
40The Akron ordinance does not define "attending 
physician." We psume that this refers to the physician 
---?. actually perform1:'t't9· the abortion. This assumption is not 
critical, however, as we hold that the State may not 
require that information on health risks be provided 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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court found that "the practice of all three plaintiff 
clinics has been for the counseling to be conducted by 
persons other than the doctor who performs the abortion," 
651 F.2d, at 1207, and determined that Akron had not 
justified requiring the physician personally to describe 
the health risks. Akron challenges this holding as 
~ 
contrary to our ~ case~ emphasiz~ the importance of 
the physician-patient relationship. In Akron's view, as 
in the view of the dissenting judge below, the "attending 
physician" requirement "does no more than seek to ensure 
that there is in fact a true physician-patient 
relationship even for the woman who goes to an abortion 
clinic." 651 F.2d, at 1217 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
specifically by any physician. 
68. 
part and dissenting in part}. 
It cannot be doubted that requiring physicians 
personally to discuss the health risks with each pregnant 
e-. JJ -w 
woman will increase the cost of providing abortions. Yet 
it also is true that in Roe and subsequent cases we have 
"stressed repeatedly the central role of the physician, 
both in consulting with the woman about whether or not to 
have an abortion, and in determining how any abortion was 
to be carried out." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 
387 (1979}. Moreover, we have left no doubt that, in 
order to ensure the safety of the abortion procedure, the 
States may mandate that only physicians perform abortion.s 
See Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 u.s. 9, 11 (1975}. We are 
not convinced, however, that there is as vital a State 
need for insisting that the physician performing the 
69. 
;e. 
abortion, or for that matter any physician, be th~~ 
~1-c?~c...~~~J~. 
individuai WAo g~ge~ ReG~ ri~~. The State's 
(\ 
interest is in ensuring that the woman's consent is 
informed and uncoerced; the critical factor is whether she 
b . h . f ~ a-~d •t ~f th 1 o ta1ns t e necessary 1n ormat1on, not ehe ide~tity o e 
" 
person from whom she obtains it. We do not believe that 
it detracts from the safety of the abortion procedure or 
c.&\s<.t vtM c.e.> 
the woman's understanding of its risks eo permit a 
physician to delegate the informational task to another 
competent and trained individual. 
Akron and the d~nter;t::ors strongly urge 
that in practice the counsellors are neither competent nor 
trained. The courts below made no such findings, and on 
the record before us we are content to rely on the 
~~-
physician's supervisory role~ to ensure that proper health 
70. 
. f . . . t d 41 1n ormat1on 1s 1mpar e . If a patient is not properly 
informed of the risks of the abortion procedure, the 
attending physician, as the ultimate person responsible 
for the medical decision to perform the abortion, may be 
held responsible. We affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals that §l870.06(C} is unconstitutional. 
VI 
The Akron ordinance prohibits a physician from 
"' 
performing an abortion until twenty-four (24} hours after 
the pregnant woman signs a consent form. §1870.07. The 
District Court upheld this provision on the ground that it 
furthered Akron's interest in ensuring "that a woman's 
41cf. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, Standards for Obstetric-GYnecologic 
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982} ("If counseling has been 
provided elsewhere, the physician performing the abortion 
should verify that the counseling has taken place."}. 
71. 
abortion decision is made after careful consideration of 
all the facts applicable to her particular situation." 
479 F. Supp., at 1204. The Court of Appeals reversed, 
finding that the inflexible waiting period had "no medical 
~~~~ 
basis," and that careful GQRS4d~atiotl of the abortion 
decision by the woman "is beyond the state's power to 
require." 651 F.2d, at 1208. We affirm~the Cotl:rt-of 
lost wages or t.rave~ expenses. Plaintiffs also contend 
"' 
~ that due to scheduling difficulties the effective 
delay ~n may be longer than twenty-four hours, and that 
~ lh"-~~ 
such/\delay ~ncrease;t the risk of an 
·L-::;;::.~-
~ey ~s~rt that for certain women, for 
seek to abort a pregnancy resulting 
~ 
incest, may suffe~onal dama~e if force 
\ ~----------------~--~ 
delay having an Akron denies that any 
~--=-risk is created by a twenty-four our 
- - ~~~~,...)) 
waiting period, an argues that a period of dela ~n 
Lr1.:l t~~~ co-unselliflcr -a+ld-t~t~~au: t;41 neficial to 
the pregnant woman. 
that Akron's imposition of a wait'ng 
is not related to a valid interest in protecting 
health of pregnant women. There is no evidence 
suggesting that the abortion procedure will be performed 
more safely, or that a woman's appreciation of the risks 
of the abortion will be enhanced, if a twenty-four hour 
73. 
delay is required as a matter of course. 42 Akron 
instead on the view that it "strikes a easonable balance 
between the state's important inter t of ensuring careful 
onsideration of that decision y the woman and the 
oman's right to decide to ave an abortion." Brief at 
43. 
Akron's err that has no legitimate interest in 
ensuring ful consideration of the abortion decision. 
impose an "informed consent" requirement to 
en ure that the decision in fact was made by the woman 
observes that 
~~~O:~na~~~~~~~~~~~~~hat proper medical 
any abortion until a 
time to consider, or 
74. 
with knowledge of the possible complications. 
have explained above, see supra at 
does not encompass an attempt to 
decision itself. It may Akron contends, that in 
some cases a twenty-fou delay would benefit the 
er "time to mull over the information 
during counseling." Brief at 47. Bu 
made b 
s prepared to give ~ 
her written informed consent and proceed with the 
abortion, a State may not demand that she delay the 
effectuation of that decision. 'Pfle maReatS*y tweAty f'Our 









abortion to "insure that the 
remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a humane 
and sanitary manner." The Court of Appeals found that the 
word "humane" was impermissibly vague as a definition of 
conduct subject to criminal prosecution. The court 
invalidated the entire provision, declining to sever the 
word "humane" in order to uphold the requirement that 
disposal be "sanitary." See 651 F.2d, at 1211. We affirm 
this judgment. 
which the District Court upheld a Pennsylva 
76. 
promulgation of administrative 
regulations governing the "humane" disposal of fetal 
remains. Akron asserts that the intent of §1870.16, li e 
the alleged intent of the Pennsylvania statute, is "'to 
preclude the mindless dumping of aborted fetuses on 
garbage piles.'" 401 F. Supp., at 573 {quoting State's 
description of the legislative intent). We are not 
convinced that §1870.16 was intended to prevent not · 
more than such "mindless dumping " The phrase "humane and 
----------------------------------~=V ' 
sanitary" does, as the Court of Appeals noted, suggest a 
possible intent to "mandate some sort of 'decent burial' 
of an embryo at the earliest stages of formation." 651 
14~ ~ 
F.2d, at 1211. This uncertainty is fatal in a provision 
that "conditions potential criminal liability on confusing 
and ambiguous criteria." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 u.s. 
77. 
379, 396 (1979) • 43 Because §1870.16 fails to give a 
physician "fair notice that his contemplated conduct is 
United States v. Harriss, 347 u.s. 612, 617 forbidder;" 
fu.L..~~ 
(1954), it vidlates the Due Process 
A. 
~ (,u-<-
We alsoA are nek~persuaded that 
./-<.. 
Clause. 
the word "humane" 
£-.e.- ~'-1 ~ 
Althoug'l'P the 
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Accordingly~e~ Appeals tHe not err- in 
~ ~ 
9l ~ tJi~ 
i-nvalidating §18-1~ i-A it~a eAtirety , The city remains 
1\ 
free to enact more ~rawn regulations that further 
its legitimate interest in proteetin9 ~1hli~ from the 
heal~er~?OE ~proper disposal of fetal remains. 
VIII 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
invalidating those sections of the city of Akron's 
"Regulations of Abortions" ordinance that deal with 
parental consent, informed consent, a twenty-four hour 
waiting period, and the disposal of fetal remains. The 
remaining portion of the judgment is re-,ersed, as ~ie hol<l 
) 
.1 ~~ 
~Akron's requirement that all second-trimester 
~· abortions be performed in a hospital is uHeoRstit~~ional. 
J 
It is so ordered. 
I 
men 02/03/83 
DRAFT NO. 2 Nos. 81-746, 81-1172 City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this litigation we must decide the 
constitutionality of several provisions of an ordinance 
enacted by the city of Akron, Ohio, to regulate the 
performance of abortions. Today we also review abortion 
regulations enacted by the State of Missouri, see Planned 
Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc v. Ashcroft, 
post, p. , and the State of Virginia, see Simopoulos v. 
Virginia, post, p. 
These cases come to us a decade after we held in Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 
entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, but it 
is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed 
by the rule of law. We respect it today. 
1\ 
I 
In February 1978 the city council of Akron enacted 
Ordinance No. 160-1978, entitled "Regulation of 
Abortions." The ordinance was prefaced by several 
findings: that Akron's citizens are entitled to the 
3. 
highest standard of health care~ that abortion is a major 
surgical procedure and that the pregnant woman's health 
must be protected~ that abortions should be performed only 
in certain hospital facilities~ that an unborn child is a 
human life from the time of conception~ that a physician 
should not have an adversary relationship towards the 
unborn child~ and that physicians are obligated to work 
'? 
4. 
toward the survival of a viable unborn child. 1 The 
1 "WHEREAS, the citizens of Akron are entitled to 
the highest standard of health care; and 
WHEREAS, abortion is a major surgical procedure which 
can result in complications, and adequate equipment and 
personnel should be required for its safe performance in 
order to insure the highest standards of care for the 
protection of the life and health of the pregnant woman; 
and 
WHEREAS, abortion should be performed only in a hospital 
or in such other special outpatient facility offering the 
maximum safeguards to the life and health of the pregnant 
woman; and 
WHEREAS, it is the finding of Council that there is no 
point in time between the union of sperm and egg, or at 
least the blastocyst stage and the birth of the infant at 
which point we can say the unborn child is not a human 
life, and that the changes occurring between implantation, 
a six-weeks embryo, a six-month fetus, and a one-week-old 
child, or a mature adult are merely stages of development 
and maturation; and 
WHEREAS, traditionally the physician has been 
responsible for the welfare of both the pregnant woman and 
her unborn child, and that while situations of conflict 
may arise between a pregnant woman's health interests and 
the welfare of her unborn child, the resolution of such 
conflicts by inducing abortion in no way implies that the 
physician has an adversary relationship towards the unborn 
child; and 
WHEREAS, Council therefore wishes to affirm that the 
destruction of the unborn child is not the primary purpose 
of abortion and that consequently Council recognizes a 
continuing obligation on the part of the physician towards 
the survival of a viable unborn child where this 
obligation can be discharged without additional hazard to 
the health of the pregnant woman; and 
WHEREAS, Council, after extensive public hearings and 
investigations concludes that enactment of this ordinance 
is a reasonable and prudent action which will 
Footnote continued on next page. 
5. 
ordinance sets forth seventeen provisions that regulate 
the performance of abortions, see Akron Codified 
Ordinances ch. 1870, five of which are directly at issue 
in this case: 
(i) Section 1870.03 requires that all abortions 
performed after the first trimester of pregnancy be 
performed in a hospital. 2 
(ii) Section 1870.05 sets forth requirements for 
notification of and consent by parents before abortions 
significantly contribute to the preservation of the public 
life, health, safety, morals, and welfare." Akron 
Ordinance No. 160-1978. 
2 "1870.03 ABORTION IN HOSPITAL 
No person shall perform or induce 
pregnant woman subsequent to the 
trimester of her pregnancy, unless 
performed in a hospital." 
an abortion upon a 
end of the first 
such abortion is 
Section 1870.l(b) defines "hospital" as "a general 
hospital or special hospital devoted to gynecology or 
obstetrics which is accredited by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals or by the American Osteopathic 
Association." 
6. 
may be performed on unmarried minors. 3 
(iii) Section 1870.06 requires the attending 
physician to make a series of statements to the patient 
"to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly 
informed consent." 4 
3 "1870.05 NOTICE AND CONSENT 
(A) No physician shall perform or induce an abortion 
upon an unmarried pregnant woman under the age of 18 years 
without first having given at least twenty-four (24) hours 
actual notice to one of the parents or the legal guardian 
of the minor pregnant woman as to the intention to perform 
such abortion, or if such parent or guardian cannot be 
reached after a reasonable effort to find him or her, 
without first having given at least seventy-two (72) hours 
constructive notice to one of the parents or the legal 
guardian of the minor pregnant woman by certified mail to 
the last known address of one of the parents or guardian, 
computed from the time of mailing, unless the abortion is 
ordered by a court having jurisdiction over such minor 
pregnant woman. 
(B) No physician shall perform or induce an abortion 
upon a minor pregnant woman under the age of fifteen (15) 
years without first having obtained the informed written 
consent of the minor pregnant woman in accordance with 
Section 1870.06 of this Chapter, and 
(1) First having obtained the informed written 
consent of one of her parents or her legal guardian in 
accordance with Section 1870.06 of this Chapter, or 
(2) The minor pregnant woman first having obtained an 
order from a court having jurisdiction over her that the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pages. 
7. 
(iv) Section 1870.07 requires a twenty-four hour 
abortion be performed or induced." 
4 "1870.6 INFORMED CONSENT 
(A) An abortion otherwise permitted by law shall be 
performed or induced only with the informed written 
consent of the pregnant woman, and one of her parents or 
her legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance 
with Section 1870.05(b) of this Chapter, given freely and 
without coercion. 
(B) In order to insure that the consent for an abortion 
is truly informed consent, an abortion shall be performed 
or induced upon a pregnant woman only after she, and one 
of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is 
required in accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of this 
Chapter, have been orally informed by her attending 
physician of the following facts, and have signed a 
consent form acknowledging that she, and the parent or 
legal guardian where applicable, have been informed as 
follows: 
(1) That according to the best judgment of the 
attending physician she is pregnant. 
(2) The number of weeks elapsed from the 
time of conception of her unborn child, based 
information provided by her as to the time of 
menstrual period of after a history and 





(3) That the unborn child is a human life from the 
moment of conception and that there has been described in 
detail the anatomical and physiological characteristics of 
the particular unborn child at the gestational point of 
development at which time the abortion is to be performed, 
including, but not limited to, appearance, mobility, 
tactile sensitivity, including pain, perception or 
response, brain and heart function, the presence of 
internal organs and the presence of external members. 
( 4) That her unborn child may be viable, and thus 
capable of surviving outside of her womb, if more than 
twenty-one (22) weeks have elapsed from the time of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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waiting period between the time the woman signs a consent 
conception, and that her attending physician has a legal 
obligation to take all reasonable steps to preserve the 
life and health of her viable unborn child during the 
abortion. 
(5) That abortion is a major surgical procedure, 
which can result in serious complications, including 
hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual 
disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in 
subsequent pregnancies; and that abortion may leave 
essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing 
psychological problems she may have, and can result in 
severe emotional disturbances. 
(6) That numerous public and private agencies and 
services are available to provide her with birth control 
information, and that her physician will provide her with 
a list of such agencies and the services available if she 
so requests. 
(7) That numerous public and private agencies and 
services are available to assist her during pregnancy and 
after the birth of her child, if she chooses not to have 
the abort ion, whether she wishes to keep her child or 
place him or her for adoption, and that her physician will 
provide her with a list of such agencies and the services 
available if she so requests. 
(C) At the same time the attending physician provides 
the information required by paragraph (B) of this Section, 
he shall, at least orally, inform the pregnant woman, and 
one of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is 
required in accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of this 
Chapter, of the particular risks associated with her own 
pregnancy and the abortion technique to be employed 
including providing her with at least a general 
description of the medical instruct ions to be followed 
subsequent to the abortion in order to insure her safe 
recovery, and shall in addition provide her with such 
other information which in his own medical judgment is 
relevant to her decision as to whether to have an abortion 
or carry her pregnancy to term. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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form and the time the abortion is performed. 5 
(v) Section 1870.16 requires that fetal remains be 
"disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner." 6 
A violation of any section of the ordinance is 
punishable as a criminal misdemeanor. 7 If any provision 
(D) The attending physician performing or inducing the 
abortion shall provide the pregnant woman, or one of her 
parents or legal guardian signing the consent form where 
applicable, with a duplicate copy of the consent form 
signed by her, and one of her parents or her legal 
guardian where applicable, in accordance with paragraph 
(B) of this Section." 
5 "1870.07 WAITING PERIOD 
No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a 
pregnant woman until twenty-four (24) hours have elapsed 
from the time the pregnant woman, and one of her parents 
or her legal guardian whose consent is required in 
accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, have 
signed the consent form required by Section 1870.06 of 
this Chapter, and the physician so certifies in writing 
that such time has elapsed." 
6"1870.16 DISPOSAL OF REMAINS 
Any physician who shall perform or induce an abortion 
upon a pregnant woman shall insure that the remains of the 
unborn child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary 
manner." 
7"1870.18 PENALTY 
(A) Whoever violates Sections 1870.02, 1870.03, 1870.04, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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is invalidated, it is to be severed from the remainder of 
the ordinance. 8 The effective date of the ordinance was 
May 1, 1978. 
On April 19, 1978, a lawsuit challenging virtually 
all of the provisions of the ordinance was filed in the 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The 
plaintiffs, respondents and cross-petitioners in this 
Court, were three corporations that operate abortion 
1870.05, 1870.06, 1870.07, 1870.08, 1870.10, 1870.14, 
1870.15 or 1870.17 of this Chapter shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor of the first degree and punished as 
provided for in Section 698.02 of the Codified Ordinances 
of the City of Akron, Ohio, 1975. 
(B) Whoever violates any other provision of this Chapter 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor of the third 
degree and punished as provided for in Section 698.02 of 
the Codified Ordinances of the City of Akron, Ohio, 1975." 
8 "1870.19 SEVERABILITY 
Should any provision of this Chapter be construed by any 
court of law to be invalid, illegal, unconstitutional, or 
otherwise unenforcible, such in validity, illegality, 
unconstitutionality, or unenforcibili ty shall not extend 
to any other provision or provisions of this Chapter." 
11. 
clinics in Akron and a physician who has performed 
abortions at one of the clinics ("plaintiffs"). The 
defendants, petitioners and cross-respondents here, were 
the city of Akron and three city officials ("Akron"). Two 
individuals were permitted to intervene as co-defendants 
"in their individual capacity as parents of unmarried 
daughters of child-bearing age" ("intervenors"). On April 
27, 1978, the District Court preliminarily enjoined 
enforcement of the ordinance. 
In August 1979, after hearing evidence, the District 
Court ruled on the merits. 479 F. Supp. 1172 (ND Ohio 
1979) • It found that plaintiffs lacked standing to 
challenge seven provisions of the ordinance, none of which 
is before this Court. The District Court invalidated four 
provisions, including §1870.05 (parental notice and 
12. 
consent), §1870.06(B) (requiring disclosure of facts 
concerning the woman's pregnancy, fetal development, the 
complications of abortion, and agencies available to 
assist the woman), and §1870.16 (disposal of fetal 
remains). The court upheld the constitutionality of the 
remainder of the ordinance, including §1870.03 
(hospitalization for post-first-trimester abortions), 
§1870.06(C) (requiring disclosure of the particular risks 
of the woman's pregancy and the abortion technique to be 
employed), and §1870.07 (twenty-four hour waiting period). 
All parties appealed some portion of the District 
Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 651 F.2d 
1198 (CA6 1981). It affirmed the District Court's 
decision that §1870.03's hospitalization requirement is 
13. 
constitutional. It also affirmed the ruling that 
§§1870.05, 1870.06(B), and 1870.16 are unconstitutional. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's 
decision on §§l870.06(C) and §1870.07, finding these 
provisions to be unconstitutional. 
Three separate petitions for certiorari were filed. 
In light of the importance of the issues presented, and in 
particular the conflicting decisions as to whether a State 
may require that all second-trimester abortions be 
performed in a hospital, 9 we granted the petitions of 
Akron and the plaintiffs, u.s. (1982). We denied 
the petition of the intervenors, u.s. (1982), but 
9see Planned Parenthood Ass' n of Kansas City, Mo. , 
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (CA8), supplemented, 664 
F. 2d 687 (CA8 1981) (invalidating hospital requirement). 
14. 
they have participated in this Court as respondents. We 
now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding 
Akron's hospitalization requirement, but affirm the 
remainder of the decision invalidating the parental 
consent, informed consent, waiting period, and fetal 
remains disposal provisions. 
II 
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 ( 197 3) , JUS'fiCE 'BLACK~HJN·y 
~ 
~ the Court "that the "right of privacy, ••. founded 
in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
and restrictions upon state action, is broad enough to 
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy." Id., at 153. Although the Constitution 
=~ ~I 
does not specificallyAeR~~rate• this right, the history of 
this Court's constitutional adjudication leaves no doubt 
15. 
that "the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the 
precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere 
provided in the Constitution." Poe v. Ullman, 367 u.s. 
497, 543 (1961) (HARLAN, J., dissenting from dismissal of 
appeal). Central among these protected liberties is an 
individual's "freedom of personal choice in matters of 
marr.s/9e and family life," Roe, 410 u.s., at 169 
(STEWART, J., concurring). See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 u.s. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 u.s. 1 
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 u.s. 510 (1925); Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The decision in Roe was 
based firmly on this long-recognized and essential element / 
of personal liberty. 
16. 
The Court also recognized, because abortion is a 
medical procedure, that the full vindication of the 
woman's fundamental right requires that her physician be 
given "the room he needs to make his best medical 
judgment." Doe v. Bolton, 410 u.s. 179, 192 (1973). See 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 u.s. 589, 604-605 n. 33 (1977). The 
physician's exercise of this medical judgment necessarily 
encompasses both assisting the woman in the decisionmaking 
process and implementing her decision should she choose 
abortion. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 u.s. 379, 387 
(1979). 
At the same time, the Court in Roe acknowledged that 
the woman's fundamental right "is not unqualified and must 
be considered against important state interests in 
abortion." Roe, 410 u.s., at 154. But restrictive state 
17. 
regulation of the right to choose abortion, as with other 
fundamental rights subject to searching judicial 
examination, see, e.g., Carey v. Population Services 
International, 431 u.s. 678, 686, 688 (1977), must be 
justified by a compelling state interest and "narrowly 
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at 
stake," Roe, 410 U.S., at 155. We have recognized two 
such interests that may justify state regulation of 
abortions. 10 
10The Court repeatedly has recognized also that, in 
view of the unique status of children under the law, the 
States have a "significant" interest in certain abortion 
regulations aimed at protecting children "that is not 
present in the case of an adult." Planned Parenthood of 
Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976). See 
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 
693, n.lS (1977) (plurality opinion). The right of 
privacy means "independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions," Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 
(1977), but this Court, and ~e law generally, has 
ArQ~arsea ~iRers as less capable than adults of making such 
important decisions. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 u.s. 622, 
~ 633-635 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); 
~ Footnote continued on next page. 
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First, a State has an "important and legitimate 
interest in protecting the potentiality of human life." 
Id., at 162. Although this interest exists "throughout 
the course of the woman's pregnancy," Beal v. Doe, 432 
U.S. 438, 445-446 (1977}, ~ it becomes compelling only at 
viablity, the point at which the fetus "has the capability 
of meaningful life outside the mother's womb," Roe, 410 
Danforth, supra, at 102 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part}. Accordingly, we have held that 
the States have a legitimate interest in encouraging 
parental involvement in the abortion decision of their 
minor children. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 u.s. 398 (1981} 
(parental notice}; Bellotti II, supra, at 639, 648 
(plurality opinion} (parental consent} . A majority of the 
Court, however, has indicated that these State and 
parental interests must give way to the constitutional 
right of a mature minor or of an immature minor whose best 
interests are contrary to parental involvement. See, 
e.g., Matheson, supra, at 420 (POWELL, J., concurring}; 
id., at 450-451 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting}. A State 
choosing to encourage parental involvement must provide an 
alternative procedure through which a minor may 
demonstrate that she is mature enough to make her own 
decision or that the abortion is in her best interest. 
See Bellotti II, supra, at 633-635 (plurality opinion}. 
I 
19. 
U.S., at 163. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 u.s. 52, 63-65 {1976}. At viability this 
interest in protecting the potential life of the unborn 
child is so important that the State may proscribe 
abortions altogether, "except when it is necessary to 
preserve the life or health of the mother." Roe, 410 
u.s.,atl64. 
Second, since a State has a legitimate concern with 
the health of women who undergo abortions, "a State may 
properly assert important interests in safeguarding health 
[and] in maintaining medical standards." Id., at 154. In 
Roe we held, however, that this health interest does not 
become compelling until "approximately the end of the 
first trimester" of pregnancy." 11 Ibid. Until that time, 




a pregnant women must be permitted, in consultation with 
11The first-trimester standard was chosen in Roe 
because un'&U that time--according to the medical 
literature available in 1973--"mortality in abortion may 
be less than mortality in normal childbirth." 410 U.S., 
at 163. There is substantial evidence that developments 
in the past decade, particularly the development of a much 
safer method for performing second-trimester abortions, 
see infra at , have extended the period in which 
abortions are safer than childbirth. See, e.g., Cates, et 
al., Mortality from Abortion and Childbirth, 248 J. Am. 
Med. Ass'n 188, 191 (1982) (abortion may be safer than 
childbirth up to gestational ages of 16 weeks). 
We think it prudent, however, to retain Roe's 
identification of the beginning of the second trimester as 
the approximate time at which it becomes compelling for 
the States to regulate in the interest of maternal health. 
The Roe trimester standard continues to provide a 
leg a .beAeRma.rlf for 1 imitiRg a State's 
to ac th e s, for the med~ 
e~denee ~ugge~ts that until approximately the end of the 
first trimester, the State's interest in maternal health 
would not be served by restricting the manner in which 
abort ions are per formed by a 1 icensed physic ian. See, 
e.g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 
1982) (uncomplicated abortions generally may be performed 
in a physician's office or an outpatient clinic up to 14 
weeks from the first day of the last menstrual period); 
Technical Bulletin of the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, No. 56 (Dec. 1979) 
("Regardless of advances in abortion technology, mid-
trimester terminations will likely remain more hazardous, 
expensive, and emotionally disturbing for women than 
earlier abortions"). Where the State adopts a health 
regulation governing the performance of abortions during 
the second trimester, the determinative question should be 7 
whether there is a reasonable medical basis for the • 
regulation, see Roe, supra, at 163, not whether it happens 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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her physician, to decide to have an abortion and to 
effectuate that decision "free of interference by the 
State." 12 Id., at 163. 
This does not mean that a State never may enact a 
regulation touching on the woman's abortion right during 
the first weeks of pregnancy. Certain types of 
regulations that impose no real burden on the woman's 
to apply to some abortions that may be safer than 
childbirth. Of course, where the State employs a health 
rationale as a justification for a complete prohibition on 
abortions in certain circumstances, the comparison between 
abortion and childbirth mortality rates may still be 
relevant. See Danforth, 428 U.S., at 78-79 (invalidating 
State ban on saline abortions, a method that was "safer, 
J 
with respect to maternal mortality, than even continuation 
of the pregnancy until normal childbirth"). 
12of course, the State retains an interest in 
ensuring the validity of Roe's factual assumption that 
"the first trimester abortion [is] as safe for the woman 
as normal childbirth at term," an assumption that "holds 
true only if the abortion is performed by medically 
competent personnel under conditions insuring maximum 
safety for the woman." Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 u.s. 
9, 11 (1975). On this basis, for example, it is 
permissible for the States to impose criminal sanctions on 
the performance of an abortion by a nonphysician. Ibid. 
v 
22. 
exercise of her right may be permissible where justified 
by important state health objectives. In Danforth, supra, 
we unanimously upheld two Missouri statutory provisions, 
applicable to the first trimester, requiring the woman to 
provide her informed written consent to the abortion and 
the physician to keep certain records, even though 
comparable requirements were not imposed on most other 
medical procedures. See 428 U.S., at 65-67, 79-81. The 
decisive factor was that the State met its burden of 
demonstrating that these regulations furthered important 
health-related State concerns. 13 
£'~ 
in those ~ 
~ ~ 13For example, we concluded that recordkeeping, "if 
not abused or overdone, can be useful to the State's 
interest in protecting the health of its female citizens, 
and may be a resource that is relevant to decisions 
involving medical experience and judgment." 428 u.s., at 
81. See infra at (discussing the State's interest in 
requiring Informed consent). 
23. 
circumstances the statutory requirements "approach[ed] J 
~ 
impermissible limits." Id., at 80 We have made clear, 
however, that even minimal intrusions on the abortion 
procedure during the first trimester may not interfere 
with physician-patient consultation or evidence an attempt 
by the State to influence the woman's choice between 
abortions and childbirth. 
From approximately the end of the first trimester of 
pregnancy, the State "may regulate the abortion procedure 
to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to 
the preservation of maternal health." 14 Roe, 410 U.S., at 
14 "Examples of permissible state regulation in this 
area are requirements as to the qualifications of the 
person who is to perform the abortion; ~ the licensure ~ 
of that person; a~ the facility in which the procedure ~ 
is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital 
or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-
hospital status; ac bo the licensing of the facility; and ~ 
the like." Roe, 410 u.s., at 163-164. 
24. 
163. The State's discretion to regulate on this basis 
does not, however, permit it to adopt abortion regulations 
that depart from sound medical practice. We have rejected 
a State's attempt to ban a particular second-trimester 
abortion procedure, where the ban would have increased the 
costs and limited the availability of abortion without 
tending to~ortant health benefits , i-R ret;url'l. / 
Danforth, 428 u.s., at 77-78. If a State requires 
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of 
abortions during this period, the health standards adopted 
must be "legitimately related to the objective the State 
seeks to accomplish." Doe, 410 U.S., at 195. Nor may the 
State interfere unreasonably with the "woman's right to 
receive medical care in accordance with her licensed 




Section 1870.03 of the Akron ordinance requires that 
any abortion performed "upon a pregnant woman subsequent 
to the end of the first trimester of her pregnancy" 15 must 
be "performed in a hospital." A "hospital" is "a general 
hospital or special hospital devoted to gynecology or 
obstetrics which is accredited by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals or by the American Osteopathic 
Association." §l870.l(B}. Since accreditation by these 
15The Akron ordinance does not define "first 
trimester," but elsewhere suggests that the age of the 
fetus should be measured from the date of conception. See 
§1870.06(B} (1} (physician must inform woman of the number 
of weeks elapsed since conception}; §l870.06(B} (4} 
(physician must informA woman that a fetus may be viable 
after 22 weeks from conception} . The normal medical 
practice is to compute the weeks of gestation from the 
beginning of the woman's last menstrual period. Under the 
latter method, the first trimester extends to the end of 
12 weeks gestation. In this opinion all references to 




organizations requires compliance with comprehensive 
standards governing a wide variety of health and surgical 
services, 16 the effect of the ordinance is to prevent the 
performance of abortions in outpatient facilities that are 
not part of an acute-care, full-service hospital. 17 
In the District Court plaintiffs sought to 
demonstrate that this hospitalization requirement has a 
serious detrimental impact on a woman's ability to obtain 
16The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals 
(JCAH), for example, has guidelines relating to such 
things as dietetic services, emergency services, home care . ) 
services, nuclear medicine services, pharmaceutical ~ 
services, professional library services, rehabilitation 
programs and services, social work services, and special 
care services. See generally JCAH, Accreditation Manual 
for Hospitals 1983 Edition (1982). 
17Akron' s ordinance carefully distinguishes between 
"hospitals" and outpatient clinics. Section 1870.02 
provides that even first-trimester abortions must be 
performed in "a hospital or an abortion facility." 
"Abortion facility" is defined as "a clinic, physician's 
office, or any other place or facility in which abortions 
.are performed, other than a hospital." §l870.0l(G). 
27. 
a second-trimester abortion in Akron and that it is not 
reasonably related to the State's interest in the health 
of the pregnant woman. The District Court did not reject 
this argument, but rather found the evidence "not so 
convincing that it is willing to discard the Supreme 
Court's formulation in Roe" of a clear line between 
impermissible first-trimester regulation and permissible 
second-trimester regulation. 479 F. Supp., at 1215. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed on a similar basis. It was 
persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that a hospitalization 
requirement did not have a reasonable health justification 
for at least part of the second trimester, but it declined 
to "retreat from the 'bright line' in Roe v. Wade." 651 
18 F.2d, at 1210. We believe that the courts below 
Footnote(s} 18 will appear on following pages. 
misinterpreted the prior decisions of the Court, and we 
now hold that §1870.03 is unconstitutional. 
A 
In Roe v. Wade the Court held that after the end of 
the first trimester the 
abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation 
reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of 
maternal health." 410 U.S., at 163. One example given of 
l8The Court of Appeals believed that it was bound by 
Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services, Inc. v. Bowen, 
496 F. Supp. 894 (ND Ind. 1980) (three-judge court), aff'd 
sub nom. Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services, Inc. v. 
Orr, 451 u.s. 931 (1981), in which an Indiana second-
trimester hospitalization requirement was upheld. We note 
that the statute at issue there, in sharp contrast to the 
Akron ordinance, defined hospitals to include ambulatory 
outpatient surgical centers. More importantly, the 
District Court in that case stated an alternative ground 
for its holding. See 496 F. Supp., at 902-903. Our 
summary affirmance therfore may not be viewed as precedent 
on the hospitalization issue. See Illinois State Board of 
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180-
181, 182-183 (1979) 0 
29. 
permissible regulation was requirements "as to the 
facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that 
is, whether it must be in a hospital or may be a clinic or 
some other place of less-than-hospital status." Ibid. 
In the companion case of Doe v. Bolton the Court 
invalidated a Georgia requirement that all abortions "be 
performed in a hospital licensed by the State Board of 
Health and accredited by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals." 410 u.s., at 203. We 
observed that the JCAH accreditation process "has to do 
with hospital standards generally and has no present 
particularized concern with abortion as a medical or 
surgical procedure." Id., at 193. This accreditation 
requirement therefore was "not 'based on differences that 
are reasonably related to the purposes of the Act in which 
30. 
it is found.'" Ibid. (quoting Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 
457, 465 (1957}}. The Court then considered Georgia's 
requirement that all abortions be performed in a licensed 
hospital. We recognized the State's legitimate health 
interests in establishing, for second-trimester abortions, 
"standards for licensing all facilities where abortions 
may be performed." Id., at 195. We reasoned, however, 
that "the State must show more than it has in order to 
prove that only the full resources of a licensed hospital, 
rather than those of some other appropriately licensed 
institution, satisfy these health interests." Ibid. We 
concluded that, in any event, Georgia's hospital 
requirement was invalid because it applied to first-
trimester abortions. 
prove that such a requirement was valid if limited to 
post-first-trimester abortions. At the same time, our 
opinion was clear that the Court would not accept 
view as to the need for a 
particular type of regulation governing the performance of 
abortions during the second trimester. This was confirmed 
in Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52 (1976). Missouri sought to ban saline amniocentesis 
abortions on the basis of evidence that an alternative 
~ NL~f)""r second-trimester abortion method was safer. The ban was 
/.v ~: /1..._ ~d because the State had failed to account for 
~ ·
12v- 4 w 
~~ -~ 
~ 
the widespread medical use of the saline method and 
because the alternative method was not widely available. 
428 U.S., at 77-79. 

32. 
In light of these decisions, we think it clear that 
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals erred in 
believing that Roe's "'bright line,'" 651 F.2d, at 1210, 
precludes a finding that certain State abortion 
regulations may be permissible only in part of the second 
trimester. The "bright line" established in Roe -- that a 
State's interest in health regulation becomes compelling 
at approximately the end of the first trimester --
identifies the point at which the State may be entitled to 
enact significant regulations governing the performance of 
abortions. The existence of a compelling state interest 
in health, however, is only the beginning of the inquiry. 
The State still must demonstrate that its regulation is 
reasonably designed to further that state interest. 
1 
We have not held that a court, in considering the 
reasonableness of a State's regulation, must view the 
risks of abortion £..nd the interests of tne StaJ: 
33. 
unvarying throughout the entire second trimester. A State 
necessarily must have some latitude in adopting 
4~~ 
regulations in this sensitive area. But it may not impose 
unreasonable regulations during part of the second 
trimester on the ground that they are reasonable for 
another part. Rather, the State has an obligation-- in 
light of prevailing medical standards -- to limit the 
effect of its regulations to the period in the pregnancy 
during which its health interest reasonably will be 
furthered. 
34. 
There can be no doubt that §1870.03's second-
trimester hospitalization requirement places a significant 
obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion. A 
primary burden created by the requirement is additional 
cost to the woman. The Court of Appeals noted that there 
was testimony that a second-trimester abortion costs more 
than twice as much in a hospital as in a clinic. See 651 
F.2d, at 1209 (in-hospital abortion costs $850-$900, 
whereas a "dilatation and evacuation" (D&E) abortion 
performed in a clinic costs $350-$400) • 19 Moreover, the 
19National statistics indicate a similar cost 
difference. In 1978 the average clinic charged $284 for a 
D&E abortion, while the average hospital charge was $435. 
The hospital charge did not include the physician's fee, 
which ran as high as $300. See Rosoff, The Availability 
of Second Trimester Abortion Services in the United 
States, Second Trimester Abortion: Perspectives After a 
Decade of Experience 35 (Berger, Brenner & Keith eds. 
1981) (hereinafter Second Trimester Abortion). 
35 . 
court indicated that second-trimester hospital abortions 
were largely unavailable in Akron. Only two hospitals in 
Akron had performed any second-trimester abortions, and 
during the year prior to trial only nine such abortions 
had been performed in them. Ibid. 20 Thus, a second-
trimester hospitalization requirement may force women to 
travel to find available facilities, resulting in both 
financial expense and additional health risk, 21 and may 
20The Akron situation is not unique. In many areas 
of this country, few, if any, hospitals perform second-
trimester abortions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687 {CAS 1981) 
{second-trimester dilatation and evacuation abortions 
available at only one hospital in Missouri); Margaret S. 
v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 192 {ED La. 1980) {no 
hospitals in Louisiana perform abortions after first 
trimester); Wolfe v. Stumbo, C80-025859L{A), slip op. at 2 
{WD Ky. Dec. 3, 1980) {no elective post-first-trimester 
abortion performed in Kentucky hospitals). See generally 
Henshaw, Forrest, Sullivan & Tietze, Abortion Services in 
the United States, 14 Family Planning Perspectives, at 
Table 12, 6, 17 {1982) {of all non-Catholic general 
hospitals, only about one in ten offers any second-
trimester abortions). 
Footnote{s) 21 will appear on following pages. 
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prevent some women from obtaining a second-trimester 
abortion at a11. 22 It therefore is apparent that a 
second-trimester hospitalization requirement may 
significantly limit a woman's ability to obtain an 
abortion. 23 
21The Court of Appeals found that the lack of 
facilities to perform second-trimester abortions already 
impedes the ability of women to obtain second-trimester 
abortions in Akron. Many women were referred by Akron 
clinics to clinics in Cleveland or in Michigan. See 651 
F.2d, at 1208. 
22 rn those States permitting post-twelve week 
abortions to be performed at outpatient facilities, a 
greater number of second-trimester abortions are performed 
than in those States that require hospitalization. See 
u.s. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Center for 
Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance, August 1978, Table 
12, at 33 (hereinafter 1978 Center for Disease Control) 
(proportion of abortions past twelve weeks of gestation is 
33% lower on the average in States with hospitalization 
requirements than in the States without them). This fact 
suggests that, in the typical State with restrictions, 
many women who might be expected to need mid-trimester 
abortions are either not obtaining them or are traveling 
to other States for these services. 
23The impact may be greatest on minors, who are more 
likely than adult women to have their abortions performed 
after the first trimester. See 1978 Center for Disease 
Control, supra n. , at Table 15. Not only must minors 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Akron does not contend that §1870.03 imposes only an 
insignificant burden on women's access to abortion, but 
rather defends it as a reasonable health regulation. This 
position had strong support at the time of Roe v. Wade, as 
hospitalization for second-trimester abortions was 
recommended by the American Public Health Association 
(APHA), see Roe, 410 U.S., at 143-146, and the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) , see 
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecololgic Services (4th ed. 
1974). Since then, however, the safety of second-
trimester abortions has increased dramatically. 24 The 
face the burdens that generally result from a 
hospitalization requirement, but they also are more likely 
to need parental permission to enter a hospital to obtain 
abortions than they are to obtain abortions in clinics. 
See Torres, et al., Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and 
Adolescents' Use of Family Planning and Abortion Services, 
12 Family Planning Perspectives 284, 286 (1980). 
Footnote(s) 24 will appear on following pages. 
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principal reason is that the "dilatation and evacuation" 
(D&E) procedure is now widely and successfully used for 
second-trimester abortions. 25 The Court of Appeals found 
that there was "an abundance of evidence that D&E is the 
safest method of performing post-first trimester abortions 
today." 651 F.2d, at 1209. 26 The availability of the D&E 
24The death to case ratio for all second-trimester 
abortions in this country fell from 14.4 deaths per 
100,000 abortions in 1972 to 7.6 per 100,000 in 1977. See 
Tyler, et al., Second Trimester Induced Abortion in the 
United States, Second Trimester Abortion, supra n. , at 
17-20. 
25There are three basic medical techniques for 
performing second-trimester abortions. The most common 
technique is D&E, which entails dilation of the woman's 
cervix and removal of the fetus vaginally by means of 
suction and instruments. A second method is to induce 
labor and expulsion of the fetus through intrauterine 
instillation of saline solution or prostaglandins. The 
third method, now rarely used because of its high risk, is 
hysterotomy, which involves a surgical incision through 
the abdominal wall and uterus, and manual removal of the 
fetus. See Grimes & Cates, Dilatation and Evacuation, 
Second Trimester Abortion, supra n. , at 119-120. At the 
time Roe was decided, the D&E procedure was used to 
perfor~first-trimester abortions, but was considered 
unsafe to use after the twelfth week of gestation. 
Footnote(s) 26 will appear on following pages. 
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procedure during the interval between approximately twelve 
and sixteen weeks gestation, the former "grey area" in 
which second-trimester abortions could not be performed, 27 
has meant that women desiring an early second-trimester 
abortion no longer are forced to incur the health risks of 
26A 1977 study conducted by the Joint Program for 
the Study of Abortion, now under the auspices of the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control, found that the relative risk 
of sustaining one or more major complications was 2.6 
times higher with saline instillation than with D&E, even 
after adjusting for such factors as gestational age, 
patient age, and level of operator training. See Cates & 
Grimes, Morbidity & Mortality, Second Trimester Abortion, 
supra n. , at 168. 
The D&E method is safer because it entails vaginal 
evacuation of the fetus using surgical instruments, is 
direct and rapid, and avoids the "uncertain induction of 
prolonged labor and the systemic side effects of the two 
instillation methods." See Grimes, et al., Methods of 
Midtrimester Abortion: Which is Safest?, 15 Int'l J. 
Gynecol. Obstet. 184, 187 (1977}. 
27 rnstillation procedures, the primary alternative 
means of performing a second-trimester abort1on, cannot be 
performed until approximately the sixteenth week of 
pregnancy because until that time the amniotic sac is too 
small. See Cates, et al., The Effect of Delay and Method 
Choice on the Risk of Abortion Morbidity, 9 Family 
Planning Perspectives 266, 268 (1977}. 
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waiting until at least sixteen weeks gestation. 
For our purposes, an even more significant factor is 
that experience indicates that D&E may be performed safely 
on an outpatient basis in appropriate nonhospital 
facilities. 28 The evidence is strong enough to have 
convinced the APHA to abandon its prior recommendation of 
hospitalization for all second-trimester abortions: 
Current data show that abortions occurring 
in the second trimester can be safely performed 
by the Dilatation and Evacuation (D and E) 
procedure .•.. Requirements that all abortions 
after 12 weeks of gestation be performed in 
hospitals increase the expense and inconveniece 
to the woman without contributing to the safety 
28A study by the Depar.tment of Health, Education & 
Welfare determined that eper:ae.er skill is the critical 
factor in predicting the risks to the health of women who 
undergo D&E abortions. This is because infection results 
from failure to evacuate completely the uterus. See Cates 
& Grimes, Deaths from Second Trimester Abortion by 
Dilatation and Evacuation: Causes Prevention, Facilities, 
58 Obstet. & Gynecol. 401, Table 1 (1981). On the basis 
of this HEW finding, the APHA has concluded that non-
hospital facilities may well be safer because of the more 
extensive abortion experience of physicians in clinics. 
See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 195 n.40 (ED 
La. 1980). 
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of the procedure. 
APHA Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services 
(Revised 1979), 70 Am. J. Public Health 652, 654 (1980) 
(hereinafter APHA Recommended Guide). Similarly, the ACOG 
no longer suggests that all second-trimester abortions be 
performed in a hospital. It recommends that abortions 
performed in a physician's office or outpatient clinic be 
limited to fourteen weeks gestation, but it indicates that 
abortions may be performed safely in "a hospital-based or 
in a free-standing ambulatory facility, or in an 
outpatient clinic meeting the criteria required for a 
free-standing surgical facility" until eighteen weeks 
gestation. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 52 (5th ed. 1982). 
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These developments, and the professional commentary 
supporting them, constitute impressive evidence that -- at 
~~~~ 
least during the early weeks of the second trimester --
D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient 
clinic as in a full-service hospita1. 29 We conclude, 
therefore, that "present medical knowledge," Roe, 410 
u.s., at 163, convincingly undercuts Akron's justification 
for requiring that all second-trimester abortions be 
29see also Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687, 690 n.6 (CAS 1981) (discussing 
testimony by Dr. Willard Cates, Chief of Federal Abortion 
Surveillance for the National Centers of Disease Control, 
that D&E second-trimester abortions are as safely 
performed outs ide of hospitals from thirteen to fifteen 
weeks); APHA Recommended Guide, supra, at 652, 654 (out-
patient D&E is safer than all in-hospital non-D&E abortion 
procedures during the second trimester); Cates and Grimes, 
"Deaths from Second Trimester Abortion by Dilatation and 
Evacuation: Causes, Prevention, Facilities," 58 Obstetrics 
& Gynecology 401 (1981) (study of the eighteen deaths 
resulting from D&E abortions in the seven-year interval 
between 1972 and 1978 revealed no higher incidence of 
deaths in nonhospital setting). 
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performed in a hospita1. 30 
Akron nonetheless urges that "[t]he fact that some 
mid-trimester abortions may be done in a minimally 
equipped clinic does not invalidate the regulation." 31 
30Akron relied largely on the former position of the 
various medical organizations concerning hospitalization 
during the second trimester. See 651 F.2d, at 1209. The 
revised position of the ACOG did not occur until after 
trial. 
Akron also argues that the safety of nonhospital D&E 
abortions depends on adherence to minimum standards such 
as those adopted by ACOG for free-standing surgical 
facilities, see Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 51-62, and that there is no evidence that 
plaintiffs' clinics operate in this manner. But the issue 
in this case is not whether these clinics would meet such 
standards if they were prescribed by the city. Rather, 
Akron has gone much further by banning all second-
trimester abortions in all clinics, a regulation that does 
not reasonably further the city's interest in promoting 
health. We continue to hold, as we did in Doe v. Bolton, 
that a State may, "from and after the end"Of the first 
trimester, adopt standards for licensing all facilities 
where abortions may be performed so long as those 
standards are legitimately related to the objective the 
State seeks to accomplish." 410 U.S., at 194-195. This 
includes standards designed to correct any deficiencies 
that Akron r~asonably believes exist in th~linics' 
present operat1on. ~ 
31The city thus implies that its hospital 
requirement may be sustained because it is reasonable as 
applied to later D&E abortions or to all second-trimester 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Reply Brief at 19. It is true that a state abortion 
regulation is not unconstitutional simply because it does 
not perfectly correspond to the asserted state interest. 
But the lines drawn in a state regulation must be 
reasonable, and this cannot be said of §1870.03. By 
preventing the performance of D&E abortions in an 
appropriate nonhospital setting, Akron has imposed a 
instillation abortions. We do not hold today that a State 
in no circumstances may require that some abortions be 
performed in a full-service hospital. Abortions performed 
by D&E are much safer than those performed by instillation 
methods, see n. supra, and the evidence before us 
concerning the need for hospitalization concerns only the 
D&E method. See 651 F.2d, at 1208-1210. Some authorities 
believe that other second-trimester abortions should be 
performed in hospitals. See, e.g., Cates & Grimes, 
Morbidity and Mortality, Second Trimester Abortions, supra 
n. , at 163-178; Second Trimester Abortion: A Symposium 
by Correspondence, 16 J. Reprod. Med. 47, 55-56 (1976), 
and at least one court has upheld a State requirement that 
all non-D&E second-trimester abortions be performed in a 
hospital. See • We need not express a view on the 
validity of such a regulation, however, as Akron has goRe ~ 
~~~ f~~tfieF by prohibit~ all nonhospital second-
trimester abortions. 
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heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a 
relatively inexpensive, other accessible, and safe 
abortion procedure. 32 Section 1870.03 "has the effect of 
inhibiting .•• the vast majority of abortions after the 
first 12 weeks," Danforth, 428 u.s., at 79, and therefore 
unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right 
to obtain an abortion. 
IV 
We turn next to Akron's parental consent requirement, 
§1870.05(B), which provides: 
"(B) No physician shall perform or induce an 
abortion upon a minor pregnant woman under the 
age of fifteen (15) years without first having 
32 rn the United States during 1981, 82.1% of all 
early second-trimester abortions (13-15 weeks) and 54% of 
all second-trimester abortions from 13-20 weeks were 
performed by the D&E method. See 1978 Center for Disease 
Control, supra n. , at Table 14; Cates & Grimes, Deaths 
from Second Trimester Abortion by Dilatation and 
Evacuation: Causes, Prevention and Facilities 58 
Obstetrics & Gynecology 401 (1981). 
obtained the informed written consent of the 
minor pregnant woman in accordance with Section 
1870.06 of this Chapter, and 
(1) First having obtained the informed 
written consent of one of her parents or her 
legal guardian in accordance with Section 
1870.06 of this Chapter, or 
(2) The minor pregnant woman first having 
obtained an order from a court having 
jurisdiction over her that the abortion be 
performed or induced." 
46. 
The District Court invalidated this provision because "it 
does not establish a procedure by which a minor can avoid 
a parental veto of her abortion decision by demonstrating 
that her decision is, in fact, informed. Rather, it 
requires, in all cases, both the minor's informed consent 
and either parental consent or a court order." 479 F. 
Supp., at 1201. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the 
same basis. 33 
Footnote(s) 33 will appear on following pages. 
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The relevant legal standards are not in dispute. The 
33For essentially the same reasons, the District 
Court held that §1870.05(A)'s parental notification 
requirement was unconstitutional. 479 F. Supp., at 1202. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. Relying on H.L. v. 
Matheson, 450 u.s. 398 (1981), the court held that 
subsection (A) "is a constitutionally permissible 
regulation insofar as it applies to immature minors who 
live with their parents, are dependent upon them and are 
not emancipated by marriage or otherwise." 651 F.2d, at 
1206. The court found it unnecessary to decide the 
validity of applying the statute to mature or emancipated 
minors since no party represented their interests. 
This conclusion seems anomalous, given that the Court 
of Appeals ruled at the same time that §l870.05(B) 's 
parental consent requirement was unconstitutional because 
it did not establish a procedure by which a mature or 
emancipated minor could obtain an abortion without 
obtaining another party's consent. If plaintiffs 
represented the interests of mature minors for purposes of 
, parental consent, see n. supra, it is difficult to see 
why they nonetheless could not raise those interests in 
challenging the facial constitutionality of the parental 
notice provision. But plaintiffs did not seek review of 
the Court of Appeals' decision on the parental 
notification provision, and the issue therefore is not 
before the Court. j ~ . 
Plaintiffs do assert that the Court f Appeals' 
holding as to §1870.05(B) is not properly before the 
~. They contend that since Akron failed to appeal the 
District Court's ruling that §1870.05(B) was 
unconstitutional, see 651 F.2d, at 1205, Akron may not 
raise the issue in this Court. They further contend that 
intervenors, who did appeal the issue to the Court of 
Appeals, lacked standing to bring the appeal because they 
did not allege that their daughters were pregnant or 
likely to become pregnant or to seek an abortion in Akron. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over 
that portion of the appeal, and this Court should not 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Court has held that "the State may not impose a blanket 
provision requiring the consent of a parent or person 
in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an 
unmarried minor." Danforth, 428 U.S., at 74. In Bellotti 
v. Baird, 443 u.s. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II), a majority of 
the Court indicated that a State's interest in protecting 
review it. 
We believe the issue properly is before the Court. A 
party who acquiesces in an adverse judgment by a district 
court may not raise that issue on a petition for a writ of 
certiorari to the court of appeals, where other affected 
parties have not sought review of the decision below. See 
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 783 
n.l4 (1980). But although Akron apparently failed to 
raise the parental consent issue in its brief in the Court 
of Appeals, the record does not demonstrate that Akron 
actually acquiesced in the judgment of the District Court. 
Akron argued on behalf of §1870. 05 (B) in the Court of 
Appeals, without apparent objection by either the court or 
the opposing parties. See Tr. Oral Argument at 8-9, 50. 
Given this ambiguous record and the plaintiffs' failure to 
raise this question below, we hold that Akron may seek 
review of the parental consent issue in this Court. We 
note that, "although we would not normally allow a party 
to make an argument it had not raised below, the fact that 
the same argument was vigorously asserted by [intervenors] 
and fully addressed by the Court of Appeals removes any 
prudential barrier to review that might otherwise exist." 
O'Bannon, supra, at 783 n.l4. 
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immature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent 
substitute, either parental or judicial. See id., at 640-
642 (plurality opinion for four Justices); id., at 656-657 
(WHITE, J., dissenting) (expressing approval of absolute 
parental or judicial consent requirement) • See also 
Danforth, 428 u.s., at 102-105 (STEVENS, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). The Bellotti II plurality 
cautioned, however, that the State must provide an 
alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may 
demonstrate that she is suffciently mature to make the 
abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, 
an abortion would be in her best interests. 443 u.s., at 
643-644. Under these decisions, it is clear that Akron 
may not make a blanket determination that all minors under 
the age of fifteen are too immature to make this decision 
50. 
or that an abortion never may be in the minor's best 
interests despite parental disapproval. 
Akron's ordinance does not create the alternative 
procedure required by Bellotti II. But Akron contends 
that the Ohio Juvenile Court will qualify as a "court 
having jurisdiction" within the meaning of §l870.05(B), 
and that "it is not to be assumed that during the course 
of the juvenile proceedings the Court will not construe 
the ordinance in a manner consistent with the 
constitutional requirement of a determination of the 
minor's ability to make an informed consent." Brief at 
28. Akron concludes that the courts below should not have 
invalidated §l870.05(B) on its face. The city relies on 
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), in 
which the Court did not decide whether a State's parental 
51. 
consent provisions were unconstitutional as applied to 
mature minors, holding instead that "absention is 
appropriate where an unconstrued state statute is 
susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary 
'which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for 
federal constitutional adjudication, or at least 
materially change the nature of the problem.'" Id., at 147 
(quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959)). 
See also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 u.s. 298 (1981) (refusing 
to decide whether parental notice statute would be 
constitutional as applied to mature minors) . 34 
34The Court's primary holding in Matheson was that 
the pregnant minor who questioned Utah's abortion consent 
requirement on the ground that it impermissibly applied to 
mature or emancipated minors lacked standing to raise that 
argument since she had not alleged that she or any member 
of her class was mature or emancipated. 450 u.s., at 406. 
No such standing problem exists here, however, as the 
physician plaintiff, who is subject to potential criminal 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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We do not think that the abstention principle should 
have been applied here. It is reasonable to assume, as we 
did in Bellotti~' supra, and Matheson, supra, that a 
state court presented with a state statute specifically 
governing abortion consent procedures for pregnant minors 
will attempt to construe the statute consistently with 
constitutional requirements. See also Planned Parenthood 
Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, post, at 
(upholding Missouri statute governing minors' abortions 
where reasonable construction is consistent with 
constitutional requirements). This suit, however, 
concerns a municipal ordinance that creates no procedures 
liability for failure to comply with the requirements of 
§1870.05(B), has standing to raise the claims of his minor 
patients. See Danforth, 428 u.s., at 62; Doe v. Bolton, 
410 u.s., at 188-189; Bellotti II, 443 u.~at 627 n.S 
(plurarity opinion). 
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for making the necessary determinations. Akron seeks to 
invoke the Ohio statute governing juvenile proceedings, 
but that statute neither mentions minors' abortions ~1 
norrr 
authority to 
suggests that the Ohio Juvenile Court has 
inquire into a minor's maturity or 
emancipation. 35 In these circumstances, we do not think 
35The Ohio Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over any 
child "alleged to be a juvenile traffic offender, 
delinquent, unruly, abused, neglected, or dependent." 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2151.23. The only category that 
arguably could encompass a pregnant minor desiring an 
abortion would be the "neglected" child category. A 
neglected child is defined as one "[w)hose parents, 
guardian or custodian neglects or refuses to provide him 
with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical 
or surgical care, or other care necessary for his health, 
morals, or well being." §2151.03. Even assuming that the 
Ohio courts would construe these provisions as permitting 
a minor to obtain judicial approval for the "proper or 
necessary . . . medical or surgical care" of an abortion, 
where her parents had refused to provide that care, the 
statute makes no provision for a mature or emancipated 
minor completely to avoid hostile parental involvement by 
demonstrating to the satisfaction of the court that she is 
capable of exercising her constitutional right to choose 
an abortion. On the contrary, the statute requires that 
the minor's parents be notified once a petition has been 
filed, §2151. 28, a requirement that in the case of a 
mature minor seeking an abortion would be 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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that the Akron ordinance, as applied in Ohio juvenile 
proceedings, is reasonably susceptible of being construed 
to create an "opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of 
the maturity of pregnant minors." Bellotti II, 443 u.s., 
at 643 n.23. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' 
judgment that §l870.05(B) is unconstitutional. 
v 
The Akron ordinance provides that no abortion shall 
be performed except "with the informed written consent of 
the pregnant woman, ••. given freely and without 
coercion." §1870.06(A). Furthermore, "in order to insure 
that the consent for an abortion is truly informed 
unconstitutional. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 420 
(1981) (POWELL, J., concurring); id., at 428 n. 3 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
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consent," the woman must be "orally informed by her 
attending physician" of the status of her pregnancy, the 
development of her fetus, the date of possible viability, 
the physical and emotional complications that may result 
from an abortion, and the availability of agenices to 
provide her with assistance and information with respect 
to birth control, adoption, and childbirth. §1870.06(B), 
quoted supra n. 4. In addition, the attending physician 
must inform her "of the particular risks associated with 
her own pregnancy and the abortion technique to be 
employed . • • " and other information "which in his own 
medical judgment is relevant to her decision as to whether 
to have an abortion or carry her pregnancy to term." 
§1870. 06 (C) . 
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The District Court found that §1870.06(B) was 
unconstitutional, but that §1870.06(C) was related to a 
valid state interest in maternal health. See 479 F. 
Supp., at 1203-1204. The Court of Appeals concluded that 
both provisions were unconstitutional. See 651 F.2d, at 
1207. We affirm. 
A 
In Danforth, supra, we upheld a Missouri law 
requiring a pregnant woman to "certif[y] in writing her 
consent to the abortion and that her consent is informed 
and freely given and is not the result of coercion." 428 
u.s., at 85. We noted that "[t]he decision to abort, 
indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it 
is desirable and imperative that it be made with full 
knowledge of its nature and consequences. The woman is 
57. 
the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of the 
decision and its significance may be assured, 
constitutionally, by the State to the extent of requiring 
her prior written consent." Id., at 67. We rejected the 
view that "informed consent" was too vague a term, 
construing it to mean "the giving of information to the 
patient as to just what would be done and as to its 
consequences. To ascribe more meaning than this might 
well confine the attending physician in an undesired and 
uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his 
profession." Id., at 67 n.8. 
The validity of an informed consent requirement thus 
rests on the State's interest in protecting the health of 
the pregnant woman. The decision to have an abortion has 
serious implications, and the State legitimately may 
SB. 
ensure that it has been made "in the light of all 
attendant circumstances--psychological and emotional as 
well as physical--that might be relevant to the well-being 
of the patient." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 u.s. 379, 394 
(1979). This does not mean, however, that a State has 
unreviewable authority to decide what information a women 
must be given before choosing to have an abortion. It 
remains primarily the responsibility of the physician to 
determine what particular information should be conveyed 
to his patient, depending on her particular circumstances. 
Danforth's recognition of the State's interest in ensuring 
that adequate information be given will not justify 
abortion regulations designed to influence the woman's 
personal choice between abortion or childbirth. 36 
Footnote(s) 36 will appear on following pages. 
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B 
Viewed in this light, we believe that §l870.06(B) 
attempts to extend the State's interest in ensuring 
"informed consent" beyond permissible limits. First, it 
is fair to say that much of the information required is 
designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to 
persuade her to withhold it altogether. Subsection (3) 
36we have not held that a State always is foreclosed 
from asserting an interest in whether pregnancies end in 
abortion or childbirth. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 
(1977), and Harris v. McRae, 448 u.s-.-297 (1980), we 
upheld governmental spending statutes that reimbursed 
indigent women for childbirth but not abortion. This 
legislation to further an interest in preferring 
childbirth over abortion was permissible, however, only 
because it did not add "any restriction on access to 
abortion that was not already there." Maher, 432 u.s., at 
474. We also have determined that a State's interest in 
~rotecting immature minors and in promoting family 
1ntegrity gives it a special interest in ensuring that the 
abortion decision is made with understanding and after 
careful deliberation. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 
U.S. 398, 411 (1981); id., at 419-420 (POWELL, J., 
concurring); id., at 421-424 (STEVENS, J., concurring in 
judgment) . --
60. 
requires the physician to inform his patient that "the 
unborn child is a human life from the moment of 
conception," a requirement contrary to the Court's holding 
. - ~-~~-~~ t~·  ~c in Roe v. Wade that a State may not use such a theory to 
d ~ ~ justify its regulation of abortions. See 410 u.s., at 
Moreover, much of the detailed description of 
~~y~~/ 
~--~/~ 
~~ "the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the 
~:~~ ~ !/' 
·J-
~p 
particular unborn child" required by subsection (3) would 
involve at best speculation by the physician. 3 7 And 
subsection (5), ~ begins with the dubious statement 
that "abortion is a major surgical procedure" 38 and then 
37This •h\/: . to, "appearance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, including 
\/', pain, perception or response, brain and heart function, 
) 
the presence of internal organs and the presence of 
external members." The District Court found that "there 
was much evidence that it is impossible to determine many 
of [these] items, such as the 'unborn child's' 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 38 will appear on following pages. 
describes numerous possible physical and pyschological 
,, , ~ 
complications of abortion, is a parade of horribles 
-
intended to suggest that abortion is a ~s 
-1 
procedure. 39 
An additional, and equally decisive, flaw with 
§l870.06(B) is its intrusion upon the discretion of the 
pregnant woman's physician. This provision specifies a 
sensitivity to pain." 479 F. Supp, at 1203. 
61. 
38The District Court found that 
evidence that rather than being 'a 
procedure' as the physician is required 
abortion generally is considered a 
procedure.'" 479 F. Supp., at 1203. 
"there was much 
major surgical 
to state ..• , an 
'minor surgical 
39section 1870.06(B) (5) requires the physician to 
state 
"That abortion is a major surgical procedure which can 
result in serious complications, including hemorrhage, 
perforated uterus, infection, menstrual disturbances, 
sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in subsequent 
pregnancies; and that abortion may leave essentially 
unaffected or may worsen any existing psychological 
problems she may have, and can result in severe emotional 
disturbances." 
62. 
litany of information that the physician must recite 
orally to each woman regardless of whether in his judgment 
the information is relevant to her personal decision. For 
example, if the physician believes that some of the risks 
outlined in subsection (5) are nonexistent for a 
particular patient, he remains obligated to describe them 
to her. In Danforth the Court warned against placing the 
physician in just such an "undesired and uncomfortable 
straitjacket." 428 U.S., at 67 n. 8. Consistent with its 
interest in ensuring informed consent, a State may require 
that a physician ~in th~ his patient mtae rJ¥aA~ 
~ the physical and emotional implications of having an 
abortion. But Akron has gone far beyond merely describing 
the general subject matter relevant to informed consent. 
By insisting upon recitation of a lengthy and inflexible 
63. 
list of information, Akron unreasonably has placed 
"obstacles in the path of the doctor upon whom [the woman 
is] entitled to rely for advice in connection with her 
decision." Whalen v. Roe, 429 u.s. 589, 604 n. 33 (1977). 
c 
Section 1870.06(C) presents a different question. 
Under this provision, the "attending physician" must 
inform the woman 
"of the particular risks associated with her own 
pregnancy and the abortion technique to be 
employed including providing her with at least a 
general description of the medical instructions 
to be followed subsequent to the abortion in 
order to insure her safe recovery, and shall in 
addition provide her with such other information 
which in his own medical judgment is relevant to 
her decision as to whether to have an abortion 
or carry her pregnancy to term." 
The information required clearly is related to 
maternal health and to the State's legitimate purpose in 
requiring informed consent. Nonetheless, the Court of 
64. 
Appeals determined that it interfered with the physician's 
medical judgment "in exactly the same way as section 
1870.06{B}. It requires the doctor to make certain 
disclosures in all cases, regardless of his own 
professional judgment as to the desirability of doing so." 
651 F.2d, at 1207. This was a misapplication of Danforth. 
There we construed "informed consent" to mean "the giving 
of information to the patient as to just what would be 
done and as to its consequences." 428 u.s., at 67 n. 8. 
We see no significant difference in Akron's requirement 
that the woman be told of the particular risks of her 
pregnancy and the abortion technique to be used and be 
given general instructions on proper post-abortion care. 
Moreover, in contrast to subsection {B), §1870.06{C} 
merely describes the general type of information to be 
65. 
disclosed and properly leaves the precise nature and 
amount of this disclosure to the physician's discretion 
and exercise of his "medical judgment." 
The Court of Appeals also held, however, that 
§l870.06(C) was invalid because it required that the 
disclosure be made by the "attending physician." 40 The 
court found that "the practice of all three plaintiff 
clinics has been for the counseling to be conducted by 
persons other than the doctor who performs the abortion," 
651 F.2d, at 1207, and determined that Akron had not 
justified requiring the physician personally to describe 
40The Akron ordinance does not define "attending 
physician." We assume that this refers to the physician 
who actually performs the abortion. This assumption is 
not critical, however, as we hold that the State may not 
require that information on health risks be provided 
specifically by any physician. 
66. 
the health risks. Akron challenges this holding as 
contrary to our cases that emphasize the importance of the 
physician-patient relationship. In Akron's view, as in 
the view of the dissenting judge below, the "attending 
physician" requirement "does no more than seek to ensure 
that there is in fact a true physician-patient 
relationship even for the woman who goes to an abortion 
clinic." 651 F.2d, at 1217 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
~annoi:- ~~eel" thet~equiring physicians 
personally to discuss the health risks with each~~ 
/'\ 
~~~~a&¢.. 
wo~R=~l add to the cost of providing abortions. Yet it 
I A 
also is true that in Roe and subsequent cases we have 
"stressed repeatedly the central role of the physician, 
both in consulting with the woman about whether or not to 
p 







have an abortion, and in determining how any abortion was 
to be carried out." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 u.s. 379, 
~ 
387 (1979). , we have left no doubt that, in 
order to ensure the safety of the abortion procedure, the 
States may mandate that only physicians perform abortio~ 
See Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 u.s. 9, 11 (1975). 
We are not convinced, however, that there is a vital 
state need for insisting that the physician performing the 
abortion, or for that matter any physician, personally 
counsel the patient. The State's interest is in ensuring 
that the woman's consent is informed and uncoerced; the 
critical factor is whether she obtains the necessary 
information from a qualified person, not the identity of 
the person from whom she obtains it. Akron and 
intervenors strongly urge that the nonphysician 
68. 
counsellors at the plaintiff abortion clinics are not 
trained or qualified to perform this important function. 
The courts below made no such findings, however, and on 
t.,U:::_ 
the record before us we cannot say that a- .p£-egmmt wfit :::. be 
Hc..t.... 11-1 ~ ~ 
unabJ:.e- -t.o- <J-ive her i~-met'l cons en t /\ to an abort ion 4+- a 
. "' 
w-t.d -C:;et ~-r~ ~ ~ 
physician delegates the informational task to another 
qualified individual. 
In so holding, we do not suggest that the State is 
powerless to vindicate its interest in making certain the 
"important" and "stressful" decision to abort "is made 
with full knowledge of its nature and consequences." 
Danforth, 428 u.s., at 67. The physician is the ~tim8~ 
~
person responsible for the medical decision to perform the 
;\ 
abortion, and the State may define this responsibility to 
include verification that adequate counselling has been 
69. 
provided to ensure that the woman's consent is informed. 41 
In addition, the State may establish reasonable minimum 
standards as to the qualifications of those who perform 
the important counselling function. 42 See, e.g., Doe, 410 
U.S., at 195 (State may require a clinic "to possess all 
the staffing and services necessary to perform an abortion 
safely"). In light of these alternatives, we believe that 
it is unreasonable for a State to insist that a physician 
~vide the information relevant to informed 
'\ 
consent. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
41cf. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, Standards for Obstetric-GYnecologic 
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) ("If counseling has been 
provided elsewhere, the physician performing the abortion 
should verify that the counseling has taken place."). 
42 [To be added: a 




to the standards 
Ass'n and other 
70. 
that §1870.06(C) is unconstitutional. 
VI 
The Akron ordinance prohibits a physician from 
performing an abortion, absent an emergency, 43 until 
twenty-four hours after the pregnant woman signs a consent 
form. §1870.07. The District Court upheld this provision 
on the ground that it furthered Akron's interest in 
ensuring "that a woman's abortion decision is made after 
43 "1870.12 EMERGENCY 
The following provisions of this Chapter shall not apply 
where there is an emergency need for an abortion to be 
performed or induced such that continuation of the 
pregnancy poses an immediate threat and grave risk to the 
life or physical health of the pregnant woman, and the 
attending physician so certifies in writing: 
(A) Section 1870.05. 
(B) Section 1870.06(B) with respect to the signature of 
one of the parents or the legal guardian of the pregnant 
women where applicable. 
(C) Section 1870.07. 
(D) Section 1870.13. 
(E) Section 1870.14(B) with respect to aftercare of an 
abortion patient." 
71. 
careful consideration of all the facts applicable to her 
particular situation." 479 F. Supp., at 1204. The Court 
of Appeals reversed, finding that the inflexible waiting 
period had "no medical basis," and that careful 
consideration of the abortion decision by the woman "is 
beyond the state's power to require." 651 F.2d, at 1208. 
We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision. 
The District Court found that the mandatory twenty-
four waiting period increases the cost of obtaining an 
abortion by requiring the woman to make two separate trips 
to the abortion facility. See 479 F. Supp., at 1204. 44 
44The District Court also found that, "when 
considered along with the requirement of subsection (C) of 
Section 1870.06 that the physician do the counseling 
required, [the waiting period] makes the cost of the 
procedure itself more expensive." 479 F. Supp., at 1204. 
Since we hold today that a State may not require the 
physician personally to counsel his patient, see supra at 
a mandatory waiting period no longer requires the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Plaintiffs also contend that due to scheduling 
difficulties the effective delay may be longer than 
twenty-four hours, and that such a delay in some cases 
could increase the risk of an abortion. Akron denies that 
any significant health risk is created by a twenty-four 
hour waiting period, and argues that a brief period of 
delay--with the opportunity for reflection on the 
counselling received--often will be beneficial to the 
pregnant woman. 
~~~~~~~~~ 
~Ws-de ftQt belie~ that any legitimate state interest 
is furthered by an arbitrary and inflexible waiting 
period. There is no evidence suggesting that the abortion 
procedure will be performed more safely. Nor are we 
patient to schedule two appointments with the physician. 
73. 
convinced that the State's legitimate concern that the 
woman's decision be informed is reasonably served by 
requiring a twenty-four hour delay as a matter of course. 
The decision whether to proceed with an abortion is 
io P£eQiseiy the type of decision as to which it is important 
to "afford[] the physician adequate discretion in the 
exercise of his medical judgment." Colautti v. Franklin, 
439 U.S. 379, 387 {1979). In accordance with the ethical 
standards of the profession, a physician will advise the 
patient to defer the abortion where he thinks this will be 
beneficial to her. 45 But if a woman, after appropriate 
45The ACOG recommends that a clinic allow 
"sufficient time for reflection prior to making an 
informed decision." Ibid. In contrast to §l870.07's 
mandatory waiting period, this standard recognizes that 
the time needed for consideration of the decision varies 
depending on the particular situation of the patient and 
how much prior counselling she has received. 
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counselling, is prepared to give her written informed 
consent and proceed with the abortion, a State may not 
demand that she delay the effectuation of that decision. 
VII 
Section §1870.16 of the Akron ordinance requires 
physicians performing abortions to "insure that the 
remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a humane 
and sanitary manner." The Court of Appeals found that the 
word "humane" was impermissibly vague as a definition of 
conduct subject to criminal prosecution. The court 
invalidated the entire provision, declining to sever the 
word "humane" in order to uphold the requirement that 
disposal be "sanitary." See 651 F.2d, at 1211. We affirm 
this judgment. 
75. 
Akron contends that the purpose of §1870.16 is simply 
"'to prevent the mindless dumping of aborted fetuses on 
garbage piles.'" Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 
401 F. Supp. 554, 573 (ED Pa 1975) (three-judge court), 
aff'd mem. sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 
(1976) . 46 It is far from clear, however, that this 
provision has such a limited intent. The phrase "humane 
and sanitary" does, as the Court of Appeals noted, suggest 
a possible intent to "mandate some sort of 'decent burial' 
of an embryo at the earliest stages of formation." 651 
F.2d, at 1211. This uncertainty is fatal in a provision 
46 rn Fitzpatrick the District Court accepted 
Pennsylvania's contention that its statute governing the 
"humane" disposal of fetal remains was designed only to 
prevent such "mindless dumping." That decision is 
distinguishable because the statute did not impose 
criminal liability, but merely provided for the 
promulgation of regulations to implement the disposal 
requirement. See 401 F. Supp., at 572-573. 
76. 
that "conditions potential criminal liability on confusing 
and ambiguous criteria." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 
379, 396 (1979}. Because §1870.16 fails to give a 
physician "fair notice that his contemplated conduct is 
forbidden," United States v. Harriss, 347 u.s. 612, 617 
(1954}, we agree that it violates the Due Process 
Clause. 47 
VIII 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
invalidating those sections of the city of Akron's 
"Regulations of Abortions" ordinance that deal with 
~ 
47Nor are we persuaded that the Cord "humane" should 
be severed from the statute. There J~~mainp doubt as to 
what disposal requirements the city intends to impose. 
Akron remains free, of course, to enact more carefully 
drawn regulations that further its legitimate interest in 
proper disposal of fetal remains. 
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parental consent, informed consent, a twenty-four hour 
waiting period, and the disposal of fetal remains. The 
remaining portion of the judgment, sustaining Akron's 
requirement that all second-trimester abortions be 
performed in a hospital, is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
men 02/11/83 
DRAFT NO. 3 Nos. 81-746, 81-1172 City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this litigation we must decide the 
constitutionality of several provisions of an ordinance 
enacted by the city of Akron, Ohio, to regulate the 
performance of abortions. Today we also review abortion 
regulations enacted by the State of Missouri, see Planned 
Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc v. Ashcroft, 
post, p. , and the State of Virginia, see Simopoulos v. 
Virginia, post, p. 
These cases come to us a decade after we held in Roe 
v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113 (1973}, and Doe v. Bolton, 410 u.s. 
2. 
179 (1973), that the right of privacy, grounded in the 
concept of personal liberty guaranteed by the 
Constitution, encompasses a woman's right to decide 
whether to terminate her pregnancy. Legislative responses 
to the Court's decision have required us on several 
occasions, and again today, to define the limits of a 
State's authority to regulate the performance of 
abortions. And arguments continue to be made, in this 
case as well, that we erred in our constitutional 
interpretation. Nonetheless, a clear majority of this 
Court consistently has accepted the basic holding of Roe 
v. Wade. The doctrine of stare decisis perhaps is never 
entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, but it 
is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed 
by the rule of law. We respect it today. 
3. 
I 
In February 1978 the city council of Akron enacted 
Ordinance No. 160-1978, entitled "Regulation of 
Abortions." The ordinance was prefaced by several 
findings: that Akron's citizens are entitled to the 
highest standard of health care; that abortion is a major 
surgical procedure and that the pregnant woman's health 
must be protected; that abortions should be performed only 
in certain hospital facilities; that an unborn child is a 
human life from the time of conception; that a physician 
should not have an adversary relationship towards the 
unborn child; and that physicians are obligated to work 
toward the survival of a viable unborn child. 1 The 
1 "WHEREAS, the citizens of Akron are entitled to 
the highest standard of health care; and 
Footnote continued on next page. 
4. 
ordinance sets forth seventeen provisions that regulate 
WHEREAS, abortion is a major surgical procedure which 
can result in complications, and adequate equipment and 
personnel should be required for its safe performance in 
order to insure the highest standards of care for the 
protection of the life and health of the pregnant woman; 
and 
WHEREAS, abortion should be performed only in a hospital 
or in such other special outpatient facility offering the 
maximum safeguards to the life and health of the pregnant 
woman; and 
WHEREAS, it is the finding of Council that there is no 
point in time between the union of sperm and egg, or at 
least the blastocyst stage and the birth of the infant at 
which point we can say the unborn child is not a human 
life, and that the changes occurring between implantation, 
a six-weeks embryo, a six-month fetus, and a one-week-old 
child, or a mature adult are merely stages of development 
and maturation; and 
WHEREAS, traditionally the physician has been 
responsible for the welfare of both the pregnant woman and 
her unborn child, and that while situations of conflict 
may arise between a pregnant woman's health interests and 
the welfare of her unborn child, the resolution of such 
conflicts by inducing abortion in no way implies that the 
physician has an adversary relationship towards the unborn 
child; and 
WHEREAS, Council therefore wishes to affirm that the 
destruction of the unborn child is not the primary purpose 
of abortion and that consequently Council recognizes a 
continuing obligation on the part of the physician towards 
the survival of a viable unborn child where this 
obligation can be discharged without additional hazard to 
the health of the pregnant woman; and 
WHEREAS, Counci 1, after extensive public hearings and 
investigations concludes that enactment of this ordinance 
is a reasonable and prudent action which will 
significantly contribute to the preservation of the public 
life, health, safety, morals, and welfare." Akron 
Footnote continued on next page. 
5. 
the performance of abortions, see Akron Codified 
Ordinances ch. 1870, five of which are at issue in this 
case: 
(i) Section 1870.03 requires that all abortions 
performed after the first trimester of pregnancy be 
performed in a hospital. 2 
(ii) Section 1870.05 sets forth requirements for 
notification of and consent by parents before abortions 
may be performed on unmarried minors. 3 
Ordinance No. 160-1978. 
2"1870.03 ABORTION IN HOSPITAL 
No person shall perform or induce 
pregnant woman subsequent to the 
trimester of her pregnancy, unless 
performed in a hospital." 
an abortion upon a 
end of the first 
such abortion is 
Section 1870.l(b) defines "hospital" as "a general 
hospital or special hospital devoted to gynecology or 
obstetrics which is accredited by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals or by the American Osteopathic 
Association." 
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages. 
6. 
(iii) Section 1870.06 requires the attending 
physician to make a series of statements to the patient 
"to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly 
informed consent." 4 
3 "1870.05 NOTICE AND CONSENT 
(A) No physician shall perform or induce an abortion 
upon an unmarried pregnant woman under the age of 18 years 
without first having given at least twenty-four (24) hours 
actual notice to one of the parents or the legal guardian 
of the minor pregnant woman as to the intention to perform 
such abortion, or if such parent or guardian cannot be 
reached after a reasonable effort to find him or her, 
without first having given at least seventy-two (72) hours 
constructive notice to one of the parents or the legal 
guardian of the minor pregnant woman by certified mail to 
the last known address of one of the parents or guardian, 
computed from the time of mailing, unless the abortion is 
ordered by a court having jurisdiction over such minor 
pregnant woman. 
(B) No physician shall perform or induce an abortion 
upon a minor pregnant woman under the age of fifteen (15) 
years without first having obtained the informed written 
consent of the minor pregnant woman in accordance with 
Section 1870.06 of this Chapter, and 
(1) First having obtained the 
consent of one of her parents or her 
accordance with Section 1870.06 of this 
(2) The minor pregnant woman first 
order from a court having jurisdiction 
abortion be performed or induced." 
4 "1870.6 INFORMED CONSENT 
informed written 
legal guardian in 
Chapter, or 
having obtained an 
over her that the 
(A) An abortion otherwise permitted by law shall be 
Footnote continued on next page. 
7. 
(iv) Section 1870.07 requires a twenty-four hour 
performed or induced only with the informed written 
consent of the pregnant woman, and one of her parents or 
her legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance 
with Section 1870.05(b) of this Chapter, given freely and 
without coercion. 
(B) In order to insure that the consent for an abortion 
is truly informed consent, an abortion shall be performed 
or induced upon a pregnant woman only after she, and one 
of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is 
required in accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of this 
Chapter, have been orally informed by her attending 
physician of the following facts, and have signed a 
consent form acknowledging that she, and the parent or 
legal guardian where applicable, have been informed as 
follows: 
(1) That according to the best judgment of the 
attending physician she is pregnant. 
(2) The number of weeks elapsed from the 
time of conception of her unborn child, based 
information provided by her as to the time of 
menstrual period and after a history and 





(3) That the unborn child is a human life from the 
moment of conception and that there has been described in 
detail the anatomical and physiological characteristics of 
the particular unborn child at the gestational point of 
development at which time the abortion is to be performed, 
including, but not limited to, appearance, mobility, 
tactile sensitivity, including pain, perception or 
response, brain and heart function, the presence of 
internal organs and the presence of external members. 
(4) That her unborn child may be viable, and thus 
capable of surviving outside of her womb, if more than 
twenty-two (22) weeks have elapsed from the time of 
conception, and that her attending physician has a legal 
obligation to take all reasonable steps to preserve the 
life and health of her viable unborn child during the 
abortion. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
8. 
waiting period between the time the woman signs a consent 
(5) That abortion is a major surgical procedure, 
which can result in serious complications, including 
hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual 
disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in 
subsequent pregnancies; and that abortion may leave 
essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing 
psychological problems she may have, and can result in 
severe emotional disturbances. 
(6) That numerous public and private agencies and 
services are available to provide her with birth control 
information, and that her physician will provide her with 
a list of such agencies and the services available if she 
so requests. 
(7) That numerous public and private agencies and 
services are available to assist her during pregnancy and 
after the birth of her child, if she chooses not to have 
the abortion, whether she wishes to keep her child or 
place him or her for adoption, and that her physician will 
provide her with a list of such agencies and the services 
available if she so requests. 
(C) At the same time the attending physician provides 
the information required by paragraph (B) of this Section, 
he shall, at least orally, inform the pregnant woman, and 
one of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is 
required in accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of this 
Chapter, of the particular risks associated with her own 
pregnancy and the abortion technique to be employed 
including providing her with at least a general 
description of the medical instructions to be followed 
subsequent to the abortion in order to insure her safe 
recovery, and shall in addition provide her with such 
other information which in his own medical judgment is 
relevant to her decision as to whether to have an abortion 
or carry her pregnancy to term. 
(D) The attending physician performing or inducing the 
abortion shall provide the pregnant woman, or one of her 
parents or legal guardian signing the consent form where 
applicable, with a duplicate copy of the consent form 
Footnote continued on next page. 
9. 
form and the time the abortion is performed. 5 
(v) Section 1870.16 requires that fetal remains be 
"disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner." 6 
A violation of any section of the ordinance is 
punishable as a criminal misdemeanor. 7 If any provision 
signed by her, and one of her parents 
guardian where applicable, in accordance 
(B) of this Section." 
5 "1870.07 WAITING PERIOD 
or her legal 
with paragraph 
No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a 
pregnant woman until twenty-four (24) hours have elapsed 
from the time the pregnant woman, and one of her parents 
or her legal guardian whose consent is required in 
accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, have 
signed the consent form required by Section 1870.06 of 
this Chapter, and the physician so certifies in writing 
that such time has elapsed." 
6"1870.16 DISPOSAL OF REMAINS 
Any physician who shall perform or induce an abortion 
upon a pregnant woman shall insure that the remains of the 
unborn child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary 
manner." 
7"1870.18 PENALTY 
(A) Whoever violates Sections 1870.02, 1870.03, 1870.04, 
1870.05, 1870.06, 1870.07, 1870.08, 1870.10, 1870.14, 
1870.15 or 1870.17 of this Chapter shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor of the first degree and punished as 
provided for in Section 698.02 of the Codified Ordinances 
Footnote continued on next page. 
10. 
is invalidated, it is to be severed from the remainder of 
the ordinance. 8 The effective date of the ordinance was 
May 1, 1978. 
On April 19, 1978, a lawsuit challenging virtually 
all of the provisions of the ordinance was filed in the 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The 
plaintiffs, respondents and cross-petitioners in this 
Court, were three corporations that operate abortion 
clinics in Akron and a physician who has performed 
of the City of Akron, Ohio, 1975. 
{B) Whoever violates any other provision of this Chapter 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor of the third 
degree and punished as provided for in Section 698.02 of 
the Codified Ordinances of the City of Akron, Ohio, 1975." 
8 "1870.19 SEVERABILITY 
Should any provision of this Chapter be construed by any 
court of law to be invalid, illegal, unconstitutional, or 
otherwise unenforcible, such invalidity, illegality, 
unconstitutionality, or unenforcibili ty shall not extend 
to any other provision or provisions of this Chapter." 
11. 
abortions at one of the clinics {"plaintiffs"}. The 
defendants, petitioners and cross-respondents here, were 
the city of Akron and three city officials ("Akron"}. Two 
individuals were permitted to intervene as co-defendants 
"in their individual capacity as parents of unmarried 
daughters of child-bearing age" ("intervenors"}. On April 
27, 1978, the District Court preliminarily enjoined 
enforcement of the ordinance. 
In August 1979, after hearing evidence, the District 
Court ruled on the merits. 479 F. Supp. 1172 (ND Ohio 
1979}. It found that plaintiffs lacked standing to 
challenge seven provisions of the ordinance, none of which 
is before this Court. The District Court invalidated four 
provisions, including §1870.05 {parental notice and 
consent}, §1870.06(B) (requiring disclosure of facts 
12. 
concerning the woman's pregnancy, fetal development, the 
complications of abortion, and agencies available to 
assist the woman), and §1870.16 (disposal of fetal 
remains). The court upheld the constitutionality of the 
remainder of the ordinance, including §1870.03 
(hospitalization for post-first-trimester abortions), 
§1870.06(C) (requiring disclosure of the particular risks 
of the woman's pregancy and the abortion technique to be 
employed), and §1870.07 (twenty-four hour waiting period). 
All parties appealed some portion of the District 
Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 651 F.2d 
1198 (CA6 1981). It affirmed the District Court's 
decision that §1870.03's hospitalization requirement is 
constitutional. It also affirmed the ruling that 
13. 
§§1870.05, 1870.06{B), and 1870.16 are unconstitutional. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's 
decision on §§1870.06{C) and §1870.07, finding these 
provisions to be unconstitutional. 
Three separate petitions for certiorari were filed. 
In light of the importance of the issues presented, and in 
particular the conflicting decisions whether a State may 
require that all second-trimester abortions be performed 
in a hospital, 9 we granted the petitions of Akron and the 
plaintiffs, ___ u.s. ___ {1982). We denied the petition of 
the intervenors, u.s. {1982) , but they have 
9see Planned Parenthood Ass' n of Kansas City, Mo., 
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 {CA8), supplemented, 664 
F. 2d 687 {CAS 1981) {invalidating hospital requirement); 
Simopoulos v. Virginia, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S.E.2d 194 
{1981) {upholding hospital requirement). Numerous States 
require that second-trimester abortions be performed in 
hospitals. See Brief for Americans United for Life as 
Amicus Curiae in No. 81-185, at 4 n.l {listing 23 States). 
14. 
participated in this Court as respondents. We now reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding Akron's 
hospitalization requirement, but affirm the remainder of 
the decision invalidating the parental consent, informed 
consent, waiting period, and fetal-remains disposal 
provisions. 
II 
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court held 
that the "right of privacy, •.• founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions 
upon state action, is broad enough to encompass a woman's 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id., 
at 153. Although the Constitution does not specifically 
identify this right, the history of this Court's 
constitutional adjudication leaves no doubt that "the full 
15. 
scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the 
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the 
Constitution." Poe v. Ullman, 367 u.s. 497, 543 (1961) 
(HARLAN, J., dissenting from dismissal of appeal). 
Central among these protected liberties is an individual's 
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and 
family life," Roe, 410 U.S., at 169 (STEWART, J., 
concurring). See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 u.s. 438 
(1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 u.s. 1 (1967); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 u.s. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 u.s. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 u.s. 
390 (1923) . The decision in Roe was based firmly on this 
long-recognized and essential element of personal liberty. 
16. 
The Court also recognized, because abortion is a 
medical procedure, that the full vindication of the 
woman's fundamental right necessarily requires that her 
physician be given "the room he needs to make his best 
medical judgment." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 
(1973). See Whalen v. Roe, 429 u.s. 589, 604-605 n. 33 
(1977). The physician's exercise of this medical judgment 
encompasses both assisting the woman in the decisionmaking 
process and implementing her decision should she choose 
abortion. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 
(1979). 
At the same time, the Court in Roe acknowledged that 
the woman's fundamental right "is not unqualified and must 
be considered against important state interests in 
abortion." Roe, 410 u.s., at 154. But restrictive state 
17. 
regulation of the right to choose abortion, as with other 
fundamental rights subject to searching judicial 
examination, must be justified by a compelling state 
interest and "narrowly drawn to express only the 
legitimate state interests at stake," Roe, 410 u.s., at 
155. We have recognized two such interests that may 
justify state regulation of abortions. 10 
10The Court repeatedly has recognized also that, in 
view of the unique status of children under the law, the 
States have a "significant" interest in certain abortion 
regulations aimed at protecting children "that is not 
present in the case of an adult." Planned Parenthood of 
Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 52, 74-75 {1976). See 
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 
693, n.l5 {1977) {plurality opinion). The right of 
privacy means "independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions," Whalen v. Roe, 429 u.s. 589, 599-600 
{1977), but this Court, and ~e law generally, has 
recognized that minors as less capable than adults of 
making such important decisions. See Bellotti v. Baird, 
443 u.s. 622, 633-635 {1979) {plurality opinion) {Bellotti 
I I) ; Danforth, supra, at 10 2 {STEVENS, J. , concur r 1ng 1n 
part and dissenting in part). Accordingly, we have held 
that the States have a legitimate interest in encouraging 
parental involvement in the abortion decision of their 
minor children. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 u.s. 398 (1981} 
{parental notice); Bellotti II, supra, at 639, 648 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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First, a State has an "important and legitimate 
interest in protecting the potentiality of human life." 
Id., at 162. Although this interest exists "throughout 
the course of the woman's pregnancy," Beal v. Doe, 432 
U.S. 438, 445-446 (1977), it becomes compelling only at 
viablity, the point at which the fetus "has the capability 
of meaningful life outside the mother's womb," Roe, 410 
u.s., at 163. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 u.s. 52, 63-65 (1976). At viability this 
(plurality opinion) (parental consent). A majority of the 
Court, however, has indicated that these State and 
parental interests must give way to the constitutional 
right of a mature minor or of an immature minor whose best 
interests are contrary to parental involvement. See, 
e.g., Matheson, supra, at 420 (POWELL, J., concurring); 
id., at 450-451 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). A State 
choosing to encourage parental involvement must provide an 
alternative procedure through which a minor may 
demonstrate that she is mature enough to make her own 
decision or that the abortion is in her best interest. 
See Bellotti II, supra, at 633-635 (plurality opinion). 
19. 
interest in protecting the potential life of the unborn 
child is so important that the State may proscribe 
abortions altogether, "except when it is necessary to 
preserve the life or health of the mother." Roe, 410 
u.s., at 164. 
Second, since a State has a legitimate concern with 
the health of women who undergo abortions, "a State may 
properly assert important interests in safeguarding health 
[and] in maintaining medical standards." Id., at 154. We 
held in Roe, however, that this health interest does not 
become compelling until "approximately the end of the 
first trimester" of pregnancy." 11 Ibid. Until that time, 
11The first-trimester standard was chosen in Roe 
because until that time--according to the medical 
literature available in 1973--"mortali ty in abortion may 
be less than mortality in normal childbirth." 410 U.S., 
at 163. There is substantial evidence that developments 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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a pregnant woman must be permitted, in consultation with 
in the past decade, particularly the development of a much 
safer method for performing second-trimester abortions, 
see infra at , have extended the period in which 
abortions are safer than childbirth. See, e.g., LeBolt, 
et al., Mortality from Abortion and Childbirth: Are the 
Populations Comparable?, 248 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 188, 191 
{1982) {abortion may be safer than childbirth up to 
gestational ages of 16 weeks). 
We think it prudent, however, to retain Roe's 
identification of the beginning of the second trimester as 
the approximate time at which the State's important 
interest in maternal health becomes sufficiently 
compelling to justify significant regulation of abortion. 
We note, for example, that the medical evidence suggests 
that until approximately the end of the first trimester, 
the State's interest in maternal health would not be 
served by restricting the manner in which abortions are 
performed by a licensed physician. See, e.g., American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Standards for 
Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 {5th ed. 1982) 
{uncomplicated abortions generally may be performed in a 
physician's office or an outpatient clinic up to 14 weeks 
from the first day of the last menstrual period); 
Technical Bulletin of the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, No. 56, Methods of Mid-
Trimester Abortion {Dec. 1979) {"Regardless of advances in 
abortion technology, mid-trimester terminations will 
likely remain more hazardous, expensive, and emotionally 
disturbing for women than earlier abortions"). The Roe 
trimester standard thus continues to provide a reasonable 
legal framework for limiting a State's authority to 
regulate abortions. Where the State adopts a health 
regulation governing the performance of abortions during 
the second trimester, the determinative question should be 
whether there is a reasonable medical basis for the 
regulation, see Roe, supra, at 163, not whether it happens 
to apply to some abortions that may be safer than 
childbirth. The comparison between abortion and 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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her physician, to decide to have an abortion and to 
effectuate that decision "free of interference by the 
State." 12 Id., at 163. 
This does not mean that a State never may enact a 
regulation touching on the woman's abortion right during 
the first weeks of pregnancy. Certain types of 
regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's 
childbirth mortality rates may be relevant only where the 
State employs a health rationale as a justification for a 
complete prohibition on abortions in certain 
circumstances. See Danforth, 428 u.s., at 78-79 
(invalidating State ban on saline abortions, a method that 
was "safer, with respect to maternal mortality, than even 
continuation of the pregnancy until normal childbirth"). 
12of course, the State retains an interest in 
ensuring the validity of Roe's factual assumption that 
"the first trimester abortion [is] as safe for the woman 
as normal childbirth at term," an assumption that "holds 
true only if the abortion is performed by medically 
competent personnel under conditions insuring maximum 
safety for the woman." Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 u.s. 
9, 11 (1975). On this basis, for example, it is 
permissible for the States to impose criminal sanctions on 
the performance of an abortion by a nonphysician. Ibid. 
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exercise of her right may be permissible where justified 
by important state health objectives. In Danforth, supra, 
we unanimously upheld two Missouri statutory provisions, 
applicable to the first trimester, requiring the woman to 
provide her informed written consent to the abortion and 
the physician to keep certain records, even though 
comparable requirements were not imposed on most other 
medical procedures. See 428 u.s., at 65-67, 79-81. The 
decisive factor was that the State met its burden of 
demonstrating that these regulations furthered important 
health-related State concerns. 1 3 But even these minor 
13
For example, we concluded that recordkeeping, "if 
not abused or overdone, can be useful to the State's 
interest in protecting the health of its female citizens, 
and may be a resource that is relevant to decisions 
involving medical experience and judgment." 428 U.S., at 
81. See infra at (discussing the State's interest in 
requiring informed consent). 
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regulations on the abortion procedure during the first 
trimester may not interfere with physician-patient 
consultation or evidence an attempt by the State to 
influence the woman's choice between abortions and 
childbirth. See id., at 81. 
From approximately the end of the first trimester of 
pregnancy, the State "may regulate the abortion procedure 
to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to 
the preservation of maternal health." 14 Roe, 410 u.s., at 
163. The State's discretion to regulate on this basis 
does not, however, permit it to adopt abortion regulations 
14 "Examples of permissible state regulation in this 
area are requirements as to the qualifications of the 
person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure 
of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure 
is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital 
or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-
hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and 
the like." Roe, 410 u.s., at 163-164. 
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that depart from sound medical practice. We have rejected 
a State's attempt to ban a particular second-trimester 
abortion procedure, where the ban would have increased the 
costs and limited the availability of abortions without 
tending to promote important health benefits. See 
Danforth, 428 u.s., at 77-78. If a State requires 
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of 
abortions during this period, the health standards adopted 
must be "legitimately related to the objective the State 
seeks to accomplish." Doe, 410 U.S., at 195. In sum, a 
State may not interfere unreasonably with the "woman's 
right to receive medical care in accordance with her 
licensed physician's best judgment." Id., at 197. 
III 
25. 
Section 1870.03 of the Akron ordinance requires that 
any abortion performed "upon a pregnant woman subsequent 
to the end of the first trimester of her pregnancy" 15 must 
be "performed in a hospital." A "hospital" is "a general 
hospital or special hospital devoted to gynecology or 
15The Akron ordinance does not define "first 
trimester," but elsewhere suggests that the age of the 
fetus should be measured from the date of conception. See 
§1870. 06 (B) (1) (physician must inform woman of the number 
of weeks elapsed since conception); §1870.06(B) (4) 
(physician must inform woman that a fetus may be viable 
after 22 weeks from conception) • A normal pregnancy lasts 
38 weeks from the time of conception. The standard 
medical practice, however, is to measure the pregnancy 
from the beg inning of the woman 1 s last menstrual period. 
Under the latter method, a normal pregnancy lasts 
approximately 40 weeks. Both methods are approximations, 
as there may be about a two-week deviation either way. 
Because of the approximate nature of these 
measurements, there is no uniform method of calculating 
"trimesters." A common method seems to be to identify the 
first trimester as 12 weeks following conception, or 14 
weeks following the last menstrual period. We need not 
try to draw a precise line for purposes of analysis, for 
we have identified the "compelling point" for the State 1 s 
interest in health as "approximately the end of the first 
trimester." Roe, 410 U.S., at 154. Unless otherwise 
indicated, alr-references in this opinion to gestational 
age are based on the time from the last menstrual period. 
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obstetrics which is accredited by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals or by the American Osteopathic 
Association." §1870.l(B). Accreditation by these 
organizations requires compliance with comprehensive 
standards governing a wide variety of health and surgical 
services. 16 The ordinance thus prevents the performance 
of abortions in outpatient facilities that are not part of 
an acute-care, full-service hospital. 17 
16The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals 
(JCAH), for example, has guidelines relating to such 
things as dietetic services, emergency services, home care 
services, nuclear medicine services, pharmaceutical 
services, professional library services, rehabilitation 
programs and services, social work services, and special 
care services. See generally JCAH, Accreditation Manual 
for Hospitals 1983 Edition (1982). 
17Akron's ordinance distinguishes between 
"hospitals" and outpatient clinics. Section 1870.02 
provides that even first-trimester abortions must be 
performed in "a hospital or an abortion facility." 
"Abortion facility" is defined as "a clinic, physician's 
office, or any other place or facility in which abortions 
are performed, other than a hospital." §1870.0l(G). 
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In the District Court plaintiffs sought to 
demonstrate that this hospitalization requirement has a 
serious detrimental impact on a woman's ability to obtain 
a second-trimester abortion in Akron and that it is not 
reasonably related to the State's interest in the health 
of the pregnant woman. The District Court did not reject 
this argument, but rather found the evidence "not so 
convincing that it is willing to discard the Supreme 
Court's formulation in Roe" of a clear line between 
impermissible first-trimester regulation and permissible 
second-trimester regulation. 479 F. Supp., at 1215. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed on a similar basis. It was 
persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that a hospitalization 
requirement did not have a reasonable health justification 
for at least part of the second trimester, but it declined 
28. 
to "retreat from the 'bright line' in Roe v. Wade." 651 
18 F.2d, at 1210. We believe that the courts below 
misinterpreted the prior decisions of the Court, and we 
now hold that §1870.03 is unconstitutional. 
A 
In Roe v. Wade the Court held that after the end of 
the first trimester of pregnancy the State's interest 
becomes compelling, and it may "regulate the abortion 
18The Court of Appeals believed that it was bound by 
Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services, Inc. v. Bowen, 
496 F. Supp. 894 (ND Ind. 1980) (three-judge court), aff'd 
sub nom. Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services, Inc. v. 
Orr, 451 U.S. 931 (1981), in which an Indiana second-
trimester hospitalization requirement was upheld. We note 
that the statute at issue there, in sharp contrast to the 
Akron ordinance, defined hospitals to include ambulatory 
outpatient surgical centers. More importantly, the 
District Court in that case stated an alternative ground 
for its holding. See 496 F. Supp., at 902-903. Our 
summary affirmance therfore may not be viewed as precedent 
on the hospitalization issue. See Illinois State Board of 
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 u.s. 173, 180-
181, 182-183 (1979). 
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procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably 
relates to the preservation and protection of maternal 
health." 410 u.s., at 163. One example given of 
permissible regulation was requirements "as to the 
facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that 
is, whether it must be in a hospital or may be a clinic or 
some other place of less-than-hospital status." Ibid. 
In the companion case of Doe v. Bolton the Court 
invalidated a Georgia requirement that all abortions "be 
performed in a hospital licensed by the State Board of 
Health and accredited by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals." 410 u.s., at 203. We 
recognized the State's legitimate health interests in 
establishing, for second-trimester abortions, "standards 
for licensing all facilities where abortions may be 
30. 
performed." Id., at 195. We found, however, that "the 
State must show more than it has in order to prove that 
only the full resources of a licensed hospital, rather 
than those of some other appropriately licensed 
institution, satisfy these health interests." Ibid. 19 We 
concluded that, in any event, Georgia's hospital 
requirement was invalid because it applied to first-
trimester abortions. 
In light of these decisions, we think that the Court 
of Appeals misconstrued the significance of Roe's "'bright 
line.'" 651 F.2d, at 1210. The Court in Roe held, and 
19we also found that the additional requirement that 
the 1 icensed hospital be accredited by the JCAH was "not 
'based on differences that are reasonably related to the 
purposes of the Act in which it is found.'" Doe, 410 
u.s., at 195 (quoting Morey v. Doud, 354 u.s. 457, 465 
(1957}}. 
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we reaffirm today, see supra at , that a State's 
interest in health regulation becomes compelling at 
approximately the end of the first trimester. This 
"bright line" thus identifies the point at which the 
State may be entitled to enact significant regulations 
governing the performance of abortions. The existence of 
a compelling state interest in health, however, is only 
the beginning of the inquiry. The State still must 
demonstrate that its regulation is reasonably designed to 
further that state interest. See Doe, 410 U.S., at 195. 
The Court in Roe did not hold that it always is 
reasonable for a State to adopt an abortion regulation 
that applies to the entire second trimester. It is true 
that a State necessarily must have latitude in adopting 
regulations of general applicability in this sensitive 
32. 
area. But if it appears that during a substantial portion 
of the second trimester the State's regulation "depart[s] 
from sound medical practice," ante, at , the regulation 
may not be upheld simply because it may be reasonable for 
a later portion of the trimester. Rather, the State has 
an obligation--in light of prevailing medical evidence--to 
make a reasonable effort to limit the effect of its 
regulations to the period in the pregnancy during which 
its health interest will be furthered. 
B 
There can be no doubt that §1870.03's second-
trimester hospitalization requirement places a significant 
obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion. A 
primary burden created by the requirement is additional 
cost to the woman. The Court of Appeals noted that there 
33. 
was testimony that a second-trimester abortion costs more 
than twice as much in a hospital as in a clinic. See 651 
F.2d, at 1209 (in-hospital abortion costs $850-$900, 
whereas a "dilatation and evacuation" (D&E} abortion 
performed in a clinic costs $350-$400) . 20 Moreover, the 
court indicated that second-trimester hospital abortions 
were largely unavailable in Akron. Only two hospitals in 
Akron had performed any second-trimester abortions, and 
during the year prior to trial only nine such abortions 
had been performed in them. Ibid. 21 Thus, a second-
20National statistics indicate a similar cost 
difference. In 1978 the average clinic charged $284 for a 
D&E abortion, while the average hospital charge was $435. 
The hospital charge did not include the physician's fee, 
which ran as high as $300. See Rosoff, The Availability 
of Second Trimester Abortion Services in the United 
States, Second Trimester Abortion: Perspectives After a 
Decade of Experience 35 (Berger, Brenner & Keith eds. 
1981} (hereinafter Second Trimester Abortion} . 
Footnote(s} 21 will appear on following pages. 
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trimester hospitalization requirement may force women to 
travel to find available facilities, resulting in both 
financial expense and additional health risk, 22 and may 
prevent some women from obtaining a second-trimester 
abortion at a11. 23 It therefore is apparent that a 
21The Akron situation is not unique. In many areas 
of this country, few, if any, hospitals perform second-
trimester abortions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687 (CA8 1981) 
(second-trimester dilatation and evacuation abortions 
available at only one hospital in Missouri); Margaret s. 
v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 192 (ED La. 1980) (no 
hospitals in Louisiana perform abortions after first 
trimester); Wolfe v. Stumbo, 519 F. Supp. 22, 23 (WD Ky. 
1980) {no elective post-first-trimester abortion performed 
in Kentucky hospitals). 
22The Court of Appeals found that the lack of 
facilities to perform second-trimester abortions already 
impedes the ability of women to obtain second-trimester 
abortions in Akron. Many women were referred by Akron 
clinics to clinics in Cleveland or in Michigan. See 651 
F.2d, at 1208. 
23 In those States permitting post-twelve week 
abortions to be performed at outpatient facilities, a 
greater number of second-trimester abortions are performed 
than in those States that require hospitalization. See 
u.s. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Center for 
Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 
1978, Table 12, at 33 (1980) (hereinafter 1978 Center for 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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second-trimester hospitalization requirement may 
significantly limit a woman's ability to obtain an 
abortion. 
Akron does not contend that §1870.03 imposes only an 
insignificant burden on women's access to abortion, but 
rather defends it as a reasonable health regulation. This 
position had strong support at the time of Roe v. Wade, as 
hospitalization for second-trimester abortions was 
recommended by the American Public Health Association 
(APHA), see Roe, 410 u.s., at 143-146, and the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), see 
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecololgic Services (4th ed. 
Disease Control) {proportion of abortions past twelve 
weeks of gestation is 33% lower on the average in States 
with hospitalization requirements than in the States 
without them). 
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1974). Since then, however, the safety of second-
trimester abortions has increased dramatically. 24 The 
principal reason is that the "dilatation and evacuation" 
(D&E) procedure is now widely and successfully used for 
second-trimester abortions. 25 The Court of Appeals found 
that there was "an abundance of evidence that D&E is the 
24The death to case ratio for all second-trimester 
abortions in this country fell from 14.4 deaths per 
100,000 abortions in 1972 to 7.6 per 100,000 in 1977. See 
Tyler, et al., Second Trimester Induced Abortion in the 
United States, Second Trimester Abortion, supra n. , at 
17-20. 
25There are three basic medical techniques for 
per forming second-trimester abortions. The most common 
technique is D&E, which entails dilation of the woman's 
cervix and removal of the fetus vaginally by means of 
suction and instruments. A second method is to induce 
labor and expulsion of the fetus through intrauterine 
instillation of saline solution or prostaglandins. The 
third method, now rarely used because of its high risk, is 
hysterotomy, which involves a surgical inc is ion through 
the abdominal wall and uterus, and manual removal of the 
fetus. See Grimes & Cates, Dilatation and Evacuation, 
Second Trimester Abortion, supra n. , at 119-120. At the 
time Roe was decided, the D&E procedure was used to 
perfor~first-trimester abortions, but was considered 
unsafe to use after the twelfth week of gestation. 
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safest method of performing post-first trimester abortions 
today." 651 F.2d, at 1209. The availability of the D&E 
procedure during the interval between approximately twelve 
and sixteen weeks gestation, a period during which other 
second-trimester abortion techniques generally cannot be 
used, 26 has meant that women desiring an early second-
trimester abortion no longer are forced to incur the 
health risks of waiting until at least sixteen weeks 
gestation. 
For our purposes, an even more significant factor is 
that experience indicates that D&E may be performed safely 
on an outpatient basis in appropriate nonhospital 
26 rnstillation procedures, the primary alternative 
means of performing a second-trimester abortion, cannot be 
performed until approximately the sixteenth week of 
pregnancy because until that time the amniotic sac is too 
small. 
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facilities. The evidence is strong enough to have 
convinced the APHA to abandon its prior recommendation of 
hospitalization for all second-trimester abortions: 
Current data show that abortions occurring 
in the second trimester can be safely performed 
by the Dilatation and Evacuation (D and E) 
procedure •••. Requirements that all abortions 
after 12 weeks of gestation be performed in 
hospitals increase the expense and inconveniece 
to the woman without contributing to the safety 
of the procedure. 
APHA Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services 
(Revised 1979), 70 Am. J. Public Health 652, 654 (1980) 
(hereinafter APHA Recommended Guide). Similarly, the ACOG 
no longer suggests that all second-trimester abortions be 
performed in a hospital. It recommends that abortions 
performed in a physician's office or outpatient clinic be 
limited to fourteen weeks gestation, but it indicates that 
abortions may be performed safely in "a hospital-based or 
39. 
in a free-standing ambulatory facility, or in an 
outpatient clinic meeting the criteria required for a 
free-standing surgical facility" until eighteen weeks 
gestation. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 52 (5th ed. 1982). 
These developments, and the professional commentary 
supporting them, constitute impressive evidence that--at 
least during the early weeks of the second trimester--D&E 
abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient 
clinic as in a full-service hospital. 27 We conclude, 
27see also Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687, 690 n.6 (CAS 1981) (discussing 
testimony by Dr. Willard Cates, Chief of Federal Abortion 
Surveillance for the National Centers of Disease Control, 
that D&E second-trimester abortions are as safely 
performed outside of hospitals from thirteen to fifteen 
weeks); APHA Recommended Guide, supra, at 652, 654 (out-
patient D&E is safer than all in-hospital non-D&E abortion 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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therefore, that "present medical knowledge," Roe, 410 
u.s., at 163, convincingly undercuts Akron's justification 
for requiring that all second-trimester abortions be 
performed in a hospita1. 28 
procedures during the second trimester). 
28Akron relied largely on the former position of the 
various medical organizations concerning hospitalization 
during the second trimester. See 651 F.2d, at 1209. The 
revised position of the ACOG did not occur until after 
trial. 
Akron also argues that the safety of nonhospital D&E 
abortions depends on adherence to minimum standards such 
as those adopted by ACOG for free-standing surgical 
facilities, see Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 51-62, and that there is no evidence that 
plaintiffs' clinics operate in this manner. But the issue 
in this case is not whether these clinics would meet such 
standards if they were prescribed by the city. Rather, 
Akron has gone much further by banning all second-
trimester abortions in all clinics, a regulation that does 
not reasonably further the city's interest in promoting 
health. We continue to hold, as we did in Doe v. Bolton, 
that a State may, "from and after the end of the first 
trimester, adopt standards for licensing all facilities 
where abortions may be performed so long as those 
standards are legitimately related to the objective the 
State seeks to accomplish." 410 u.s., at 194-195. This 
includes standards designed to correct any deficiencies 
that Akron reasonably believes exist in the clinics' 
present operation. 
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Akron nonetheless urges that "[t]he fact that some 
mid-trimester abortions may be done in a minimally 
equipped clinic does not invalidate the regulation." 29 
Reply Brief at 19. It is true that a state abortion 
regulation is not unconstitutional simply because it does 
29The city thus implies that its hospital 
requirement may be sustained because it is reasonable as 
applied to later D&E abortions or to all second-trimester 
instillation abortions. We do not hold today that a State 
in no circumstances may require that some abortions be 
performed in a full-service hospital. Abortions performed 
by D&E are much safer than those performed by instillation 
methods, see n. supra, and the evidence before us 
concerning the need for hospitalization concerns only the 
D&E method performed in the early weeks of the second 
trimester. See 651 F.2d, at 1208-1210. There are some 
indications that hospitalization is important for D&E 
abortions performed in the later weeks, see Cates and 
Grimes, "Deaths from Second Trimester Abortion by 
Dilatation and Evacuation: Causes, Prevention, 
Facilities," 58 Obstetrics & Gynecology 401 (1981), or 
generally for other second-trimester abortion techniques, 
see Cates & Grimes, Morbidity and Mortality, Second 
Trimester Abortions, supra n. , at 163-178. At least one 
court has upheld a State requirement that all non-D&E 
second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital. 
See Livingston v. New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners, 
68 N.J. Super. 259, 402 A.2d 967 (1979). We need not 
express a view on the validity of such a regulation, 
however, as Akron prohibits all nonhospital second-
trimester abortions. 
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not perfectly correspond to the asserted state interest. 
But the lines drawn in a state regulation must be 
reasonable, and this cannot be said of §1870.03. By 
preventing the performance of D&E abortions in an 
appropriate nonhospital setting, Akron has imposed a 
heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a 
relatively inexpensive, other accessible, and safe 
abortion procedure. 30 Section 1870.03 "has the effect of 
inhibiting .•• the vast majority of abortions after the 
first 12 weeks," Danforth, 428 u.s., at 79, and therefore 
unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right 
to obtain an abortion. 
30 rn the United States during 197-, 82.1% of all 
early second-trimester abortions (13-15 weeks) and 54% of 
all second-trimester abortions from 13-20 weeks were 
performed by the D&E method. See 1978 Center for Disease 
Control, supra n. , at Table 14. 
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IV 
We turn next to Akron's parental consent requirement, 
§1870.05{B), which provides: 
"{B) No physician shall perform or induce an 
abortion upon a minor pregnant woman under the 
age of fifteen {15) years without first having 
obtained the informed written consent of the 
minor pregnant woman in accordance with Section 
1870.06 of this Chapter, and 
{1) First having obtained the informed 
written consent of one of her parents or her 
legal guardian in accordance with Section 
1870.06 of this Chapter, or 
{2) The minor pregnant woman first having 
obtained an order from a court having 
jurisdiction over her that the abortion be 
performed or induced." 
The District Court invalidated this provision because "it 
does not establish a procedure by which a minor can avoid 
a parental veto of her abortion decision by demonstrating 
that her decision is, in fact, informed. Rather, it 
requires, in all cases, both the minor's informed consent 
and either parental consent or a court order." 479 F. 
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Supp., at 1201. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the 
same basis. 31 
The relevant legal standards are not in dispute. The 
Court has held that "the State may not impose a blanket 
provision requiring the consent of a parent or person 
in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an 
unmarried minor." Danforth, 428 u.s., at 74. In Bellotti 
v. Baird, 443 u.s. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II), a majority of 
the Court indicated that a State's interest in protecting 
immature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent 
substitute, either parental or judicial. See id., at 640-





Court of Appeals upheld §1870.05(A) 's 
requirement. See 651 F.2d at 1206. The 
this ruling has not been challenged in this 
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(WHITE, J., dissenting) (expressing approval of absolute 
parental or judicial consent requirement) • See also 
Danforth, 428 U.S., at 102-105 (STEVENS, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). The Bellotti II plurality 
cautioned, however, that the State must provide an 
alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may 
demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to make the 
abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, 
an abortion would be in her best interests. 443 U.S., at 
643-644. Under these decisions, it is clear that Akron 
may not make a blanket determination that all minors under 
the age of fifteen are too immature to make this decision 
or that an abortion never may be in the minor's best 
interests despite parental disapproval. 
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Akron's ordinance does not create the alternative 
procedure required by Bellotti II. But Akron contends 
that the Ohio Juvenile Court will qualify as a "court 
having jurisdiction" within the meaning of §1870.05(B), 
and that "it is not to be assumed that during the course 
of the juvenile proceedings the Court will not construe 
the ordinance in a manner consistent with the 
constitutional requirement of a determination of the 
minor's ability to make an informed consent." Brief at 
28. Akron concludes that the courts below should not have 
invalidated §1870.05(B) on its face. The city relies on 
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), in 
which the Court did not decide whether a State's parental 
consent provisions were unconstitutional as applied to 
mature minors, holding instead that "absention is 
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appropriate where an unconstrued state statute is 
susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary 
'which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for 
federal constitutional adjudication, or at least 
materially change the nature of the problem.'" Id., at 147 
(quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959)). 
See also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 u.s. 298 (1981) (refusing 
to decide whether parental notice statute would be 
constitutional as applied to mature minors) .3 2 
32The Court's primary holding in Matheson was that 
the pregnant minor who questioned Utah's abortion consent 
requirement on the ground that it impermissibly applied to 
mature or emancipated minors lacked standing to raise that 
argument since she had not alleged that she or any member 
of her class was mature or emancipated. 450 u.s., at 406. 
No such standing problem exists here, however, as the 
physician plaintiff, who is subject to potential criminal 
liability for failure to comply with the requirements of 
§1870.05(B), has standing to raise the claims of his minor 
patients. See Danforth, 428 u.s., at 62; Doe v. Bolton, 
410 u.s., at 188-189; Bellotti II, 443 u.s:-;- at 627 n.5 
(plurarity opinion). 
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We do not think that the abstention principle should 
have been applied here. It is reasonable to assume, as we 
did in Bellotti ~' supra, and Matheson, supra, that a 
state court presented with a state statute specifically 
governing abortion consent procedures for pregnant minors 
will attempt to construe the statute consistently with 
constitutional requirements. See also Planned Parenthood 
Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, post, at 
(upholding Missouri statute governing minors' abortions 
where reasonable construction is consistent with 
constitutional requirements). This suit, however, 
concerns a municipal ordinance that creates no procedures 
for making the necessary determinations. Akron seeks to 
invoke the Ohio statute governing juvenile proceedings, 
but that statute neither mentions minors' abortions nor 
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suggests that the Ohio Juvenile Court has authority to 
inquire into a minor's maturity or emancipation. 33 In 
these circumstances, we do not think that the Akron 
ordinance, as applied in Ohio juvenile proceedings, is 
reasonably susceptible of being construed to create an 
33The Ohio Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over any 
child "alleged to be a juvenile traffic offender, 
delinquent, unruly, abused, neglected, or dependent." 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.23. The only category that 
arguably could encompass a pregnant minor desiring an 
abortion would be the "neglected" child category. A 
neglected child is defined as one "[w]hose parents, 
guardian or custodian neglects or refuses to provide him 
with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical 
or surgical care, or other care necessary for his health, 
morals, or well being." §2151.03. Even assuming that the 
Ohio courts would construe these provisions as permitting 
a minor to obtain judicial approval for the "proper or 
necessary . . . medical or surgical care" of an abortion, 
where her parents had refused to provide that care, the 
statute makes no provision for a mature or emancipated 
minor completely to avoid hostile parental involvement by 
demonstrating to the satisfaction of the court that she is 
capable of exercising her constitutional right to choose 
an abortion. On the contrary, the statute requires that 
the minor's parents be notified once a petition has been 
filed, §2151.28, a requirement that in the case of a 
mature minor seeking an abortion would be 
unconstitutional. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 u.s. 398, 420 
(1981) (POWELL, J., concurring): id., at 428 n.3 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). ---
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"opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the maturity 
of pregnant minors." Bellotti II, 443 u.s., at 643 n.23. 
We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that 
§1870.05(B) is unconstitutional. 
v 
The Akron ordinance provides that no abortion shall 
be performed except "with the informed written consent of 
the pregnant woman, •.. given freely and without 
coercion." §1870.06(A). Furthermore, "in order to insure 
that the consent for an abortion is truly informed 
consent," the woman must be "orally informed by her 
attending physician" of the status of her pregnancy, the 
development of her fetus, the date of possible viability, 
the physical and emotional complications that may result 
from an abortion, and the availability of agenices to 
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provide her with assistance and information with respect 
to birth control, adoption, and childbirth. §1870.06(B), 
quoted supra n. 4. In addition, the attending physician 
must inform her "of the particular risks associated with 
her own pregnancy and the abortion technique to be 
employed •••• " and other information "which in his own 
medical judgment is relevant to her decision as to whether 
to have an abortion or carry her pregnancy to term." 
§1870. 06 (C). 
The District Court found that §1870.06(B) was 
unconstitutional, but that §1870.06(C) was related to a 
valid state interest in maternal health. See 479 F. 
Supp., at 1203-1204. The Court of Appeals concluded that 
both provisions were unconstitutional. See 651 F.2d, at 
1207. We affirm. 
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A 
In Danforth, supra, we upheld a Missouri law 
requiring a pregnant woman to "certif[y] in writing her 
consent to the abortion and that her consent is informed 
and freely given and is not the result of coercion." 428 
u.s., at 85. We noted that "[t]he decision to abort, 
indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it 
is desirable and imperative that it be made with full 
knowledge of its nature and consequences. The woman is 
the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of the 
decision and its significance may be assured, 
constitutionally, by the State to the extent of requiring 
her prior written consent." Id., at 67. We rejected the 
view that "informed consent" was too vague a term, 
construing it to mean "the giving of information to the 
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patient as to just what would be done and as to its 
consequences. To ascribe more meaning than this might 
well confine the attending physician in an undesired and 
uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his 
profession." Id., at 67 n.8. 
The validity of an informed consent requirement thus 
rests on the State's interest in protecting the health of 
the pregnant woman. The decision to have an abortion has 
serious implications, and the State legitimately may 
ensure that it has been made "in the light of all 
attendant circumstances--psychological and emotional as 
well as physical--that might be relevant to the well-being 
of the patient." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 u.s. 379, 394 
(1979). This does not mean, however, that a State has 
unreviewable authority to decide what information a women 
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must be given before choosing to have an abortion. It 
remains primarily the responsibility of the physician to 
determine what particular information should be conveyed 
to his patient, depending on her particular circumstances. 
Danforth's recognition of the State's interest in ensuring 
that adequate information be given will not justify 
abortion regulations designed to influence the woman's 
personal choice between abortion or childbirth. 34 
34we have not held that a State always is foreclosed 
from asserting an interest in whether pregnancies end in 
abortion or childbirth. In Maher v. Roe, 432 u.s. 464 
(1977), and Harris v. McRae, 448 u.s-.--297 (1980), we 
upheld governmental spending statutes that reimbursed 
indigent women for childbirth but not abortion. This 
legislation to further an interest in preferring 
childbirth over abortion was permissible, however, only 
because it did not add "any restriction on access to 
abortion that was not already there." Maher, 432 u.s., at 
474. We also have determined that a State's interest in 
protecting immature minors and in promoting family 
integrity gives it a special interest in ensuring that the 
abortion decision is made with understanding and after 
careful deliberation. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 
U.S. 398, 411 (1981): id., at 419-420 (POWELL, J., 
concurring): id., at 421-424 (STEVENS, J., concurring in 
--pQotnote continued on next page. 
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B 
Viewed in this light, we believe that §1870.06{B) 
attempts to extend the State's interest in ensuring 
"informed consent" beyond permissible limits. First, it 
is fair to say that much of the information required is 
designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to 
persuade her to withhold it altogether. Subsection {3) 
requires the physician to inform his patient that "the 
unborn child is a human life from the moment of 
conception," a requirement contrary to the Court's holding 
in Roe v. Wade that a State may not use such a theory to 
justify its regulation of abortions. See 410 u.s., at 
159-162. Moreover, much of the detailed description of 
judgment) • 
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"the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the 
particular unborn child" required by subsection (3) would 
involve at best speculation by the physician. 35 And 
subsection (5), which begins with the dubious statement 
that "abortion is a major surgical procedure" 36 and then 
describes numerous possible physical and pyschological 
complications of abortion,3 7 is a "parade of horribles" 
35This description must include, but not be limited 
to, "appearance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, including 
pain, perception or response, brain and heart function, 
the presence of internal organs and the presence of 
external members." The District Court found that "there 
was much evidence that it is impossible to determine many 
of [these] items, such as the 'unborn child's' 
sensitivity to pain." 479 F. Supp, at 1203. 
36The District Court found that 
evidence that rather than being 'a 
procedure' as the physician is required 
abortion generally is considered a 
procedure.'" 479 F. Supp., at 1203. 
"there was much 
major surgical 
to state •.. , an 
'minor surgical 
3 7 Sect ion 1870.06 (B) ( 5) requires the physic ian to 
state 
"That abortion is a major surgical procedure which can 
result in serious complications, including hemorrhage, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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intended to suggest that abortion is a particularly 
dangerous procedure. 
An additional, and equally decisive, flaw with 
§1870.06(B) is its intrusion upon the discretion of the 
pregnant woman's physician. This provision specifies a 
litany of information that the physician must recite 
orally to each woman regardless of whether in his judgment 
the information is relevant to her personal decision. For 
example, if the physician believes that some of the risks 
outlined in subsection (5) are nonexistent for a 
particular patient, he remains obligated to describe them 
perforated uterus, infection, menstrual disturbances, 
sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in subsequent 
pregnancies; and that abortion may leave essentially 
unaffected or may worsen any existing psychological 
problems she may have, and can result in severe emotional 
disturbances." 
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to her. In Danforth the Court warned against placing the 
physician in just such an "undesired and uncomfortable 
straitjacket." 428 U.S., at 67 n. 8. Consistent with its 
interest in ensuring informed consent, a State may require 
that a physician make certain that his patient understands 
the physical and emotional implications of having an 
abortion. But Akron has gone far beyond merely describing 
the general subject matter relevant to informed consent. 
By insisting upon recitation of a lengthy and inflexible 
list of information, Akron unreasonably has placed 
"obstacles in the path of the doctor upon whom [the woman 
is] entitled to rely for advice in connection with her 
decision." Whalen v. Roe, 429 u.s. 589, 604 n. 33 
(1977) • 38 
Footnote(s) 38 will appear on following pages. 
c 
Section 1870.06(C) presents a different question. 
Under this provision, the "attending physician" must 
inform the woman 
"of the particular risks associated with her own 
pregnancy and the abortion technique to be 
employed including providing her with at least a 
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38Akron has made little effort to defend the 
constitutionality of §§1870.06(B){3), (4), and (5), but 
argues that the remaining four subsections of the 
provision are valid and severable. These four subsections 
require that the patient be informed of the fact that she 
is pregnant, §l870.06(B){l), the gestational age of the 
fetus, §1870.06(B) (2), and the availability of agencies 
and services to provide information on birth control and 
adoption and assistance during pregnancy and after 
childbirth, §§1870.06 (B) (6) (7). We do not believe that 
severing these subsections would be appropriate. Though 
this information is considerably less inflammatory than 
that set forth in subsections (3), {4), and (5}, on the 
whole even it reflects some effort to influence the woman 
to forego having an abortion. Moreover, these provisions 
constitute an interference with the role of the physician 
by requiring him to disclose information that is 
irrelevant to informed consent (birth control information, 
§1870.06(B) (6}}, or that might as well be conveyed by some 
other individual (adoption and pregnancy assistance 
information, §1870.06(B} (7}). See infra at In sum, 
while we do not suggest that a State has no interest in 
making sure that useful and relevant information is made 
available to the woman, we do believe that Akron's 
specific list of matters that must be disclosed is an 
impermissible means of achieving this goal. 
general description of the medical instructions 
to be followed subsequent to the abortion in 
order to insure her safe recovery, and shall in 
addition provide her with such other information 
which in his own medical judgment is relevant to 
her decision as to whether to have an abortion 
or carry her pregnancy to term." 
The information required clearly is related to 
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maternal health and to the State's legitimate purpose in 
requiring informed consent. Nonetheless, the Court of 
Appeals determined that it interfered with the physician's 
medical judgment "in exactly the same way as section 
1870.06(B). It requires the doctor to make certain 
disclosures in all cases, regardless of his own 
professional judgment as to the desirability of doing so." 
651 F.2d, at 1207. This was a misapplication of Danforth. 
There we construed "informed consent" to mean "the giving 
of information to the patient as to just what would be 
done and as to its consequences." 428 u.s., at 67 n. 8. 
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We see no significant difference in Akron's requirement 
that the woman be told of the particular risks of her 
pregnancy and the abortion technique to be used and be 
given general instructions on proper post-abortion care. 
Moreover, in contrast to subsection (B), §1870.06(C) 
merely describes the general type of information to be 
disclosed and properly leaves the precise nature and 
amount of this disclosure to the physician's discretion 
and exercise of his "medical judgment." 
The Court of Appeals also held, however, that 
§1870.06(C) was invalid because it required that the 
disclosure be made by the "attending physician." The 
court found that "the practice of all three plaintiff 
clinics has been for the counseling to be conducted by 
persons other than the doctor who performs the abortion," 
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651 F.2d, at 1207, and determined that Akron had not 
justified requiring the physician personally to describe 
the health risks. Akron challenges this holding as 
contrary to our cases that emphasize the importance of the 
physician-patient relationship. In Akron's view, as in 
the view of the dissenting judge below, the "attending 
physician" requirement "does no more than seek to ensure 
that there is in fact a true physician-patient 
relationship even for the woman who goes to an abortion 
clinic." 651 F.2d, at 1217 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) . 
Requiring physicians personally to discuss the health 
risks with each patient may in many cases add to the cost 
of providing abortions. Yet it also is true that in Roe 
and subsequent cases we have "stressed repeatedly the 
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central role of the physician, both in consulting with the 
woman about whether or not to have an abortion, and in 
determining how any abortion was to be carried out." 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 u.s. 379, 387 (1979). Moreover, 
we have left no doubt that, in order to ensure the safety 
of the abortion procedure, the States may mandate that 
only physicians perform abortions. See, Roe, 410 u.s., at 
: Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975). 
We are not convinced, however, that there is a vital 
state need for insisting that the physician performing the 
abortion, or for that matter any physician, personally 
counsel the patient. The State's interest is in ensuring 
that the woman's consent is informed and uncoerced; the 
critical factor is whether she obtains the necessary 
information from a qualified person, not the identity of 
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the person from whom she obtains it. Akron and 
intervenors strongly urge that the nonphysician 
counsellors at the plaintiff abortion clinics are not 
trained or qualified to perform this important function. 
The courts below made no such findings, however, and on 
the record before us we cannot say that the woman's 
consent to the abortion will not be informed if a 
physician delegates the informational task to another 
qualified individual. 
In so holding, we do not suggest that the State is 
powerless to vindicate its interest in making certain the 
"important" and "stressful" decision to abort "is made 
with full knowledge of its nature and consequences." 
Danforth, 428 u.s., at 67. The physician is the person 
ultimately responsible for the medical decision to perform 
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the abortion, and the State may define this responsibility 
to include verification that adequate counselling has been 
provided to ensure that the woman's consent is informed. 39 
In addition, the State may establish reasonable minimum 
standards as to the qualifications of those who perform 
the important counselling function. 40 See, e.g., Doe, 410 
u.s., at 195 {State may require a medical facility "to 
possess all the staffing and services necessary to perform 
an abortion safely"}. In light of these alternatives, we 
believe that it is unreasonable for a State to insist that 
39cf. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, Standards for Obstetric-GYnecologic 
Services 54 {5th ed. 1982} {"If counseling has been 
provided elsewhere, the physician performing the abortion 
should verify that the counseling has taken place."}. 
40 [To be added: a "cf" reference to the standards 
prescribed by American Psychological Ass'n and other 
groups.] 
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a physician personally provide the information relevant to 
informed consent. We affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals that §1870.06(C) is unconstitutional. 
VI 
The Akron ordinance prohibits a physician from 
performing an abortion, absent an emergency, 41 until 
twenty-four hours after the pregnant woman signs a consent 
form. §1870.07. The District Court upheld this provision 
41 "1870.12 EMERGENCY 
The following prov1s1ons of this Chapter shall not apply 
where there is an emergency need for an abortion to be 
performed or induced such that continuation of the 
pregnancy poses an immediate threat and grave risk to the 
1 i fe or physical health of the pregnant woman, and the 
attending physician so certifies in writing: 
(A) Section 1870.05. 
(B) Section 1870.06(B) with respect to the signature of 
one of the parents or the legal guardian of the pregnant 
women where applicable. 
(C) Section 1870.07. 
(D) Section 1870.13. 
(E) Section 1870.14(B) with respect to aftercare of an 
abortion patient." 
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on the ground that it furthered Akron's interest in 
ensuring "that a woman's abortion decision is made after 
careful consideration of all the facts applicable to her 
particular situation." 479 F. Supp., at 1204. The Court 
of Appeals reversed, finding that the inflexible waiting 
period had "no medical basis," and that careful 
consideration of the abortion decision by the woman "is 
beyond the state's power to require." 651 F.2d, at 1208. 
We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision. 
The District Court found that the mandatory twenty-
four waiting period increases the cost of obtaining an 
abortion by requiring the woman to make two separate trips 
to the abortion facility. See 479 F. Supp., at 1204. 
Plaintiffs also contend that due to scheduling 
difficulties the effective delay may be longer than 
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twenty-four hours, and that such a delay in some cases 
could increase the risk of an abortion. Akron denies that 
any significant health risk is created by a twenty-four 
hour waiting period, and argues that a brief period of 
delay--with the opportunity for reflection on the 
counselling received--often will be beneficial to the 
pregnant woman. 
We find that Akron has failed to demonstrate that any 
legitimate state interest is furthered by an arbitrary and 
inflexible waiting period. There is no evidence 
suggesting that the abortion procedure will be performed 
more safely. Nor are we convinced that the State's 
legitimate concern that the woman's decision be informed 
is reasonably served by requiring a twenty-four hour delay 
as a matter of course. The decision whether to proceed 
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with an abortion is the type of decision as to which it is 
important to "afford[] the physician adequate discretion 
in the exercise of his medical judgment." Colautti v. 
Franklin, 439 u.s. 379, 387 (1979). In accordance with 
the ethical standards of the profession, a physician will 
advise the patient to defer the abortion where he thinks 
this will be beneficial to her. 42 But if a woman, after 
appropriate counselling, is prepared to give her written 
informed consent and proceed with the abortion, a State 
may not demand that she delay the effectuation of that 
decision. 
42The ACOG recommends that a clinic allow 
"sufficient time for reflection prior to making an 
informed decision." Ibid. In contrast to §1870.07's 
mandatory waiting period, this standard recognizes that 
the time needed for consideration of the decision varies 
depending on the particular situation of the patient and 
how much prior counselling she has received. 
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VII 
Section §1870.16 of the Akron ordinance requires 
physicians performing abortions to "insure that the 
remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a humane 
and sanitary manner." The Court of Appeals found that the 
word "humane" was impermissibly vague as a definition of 
conduct subject to criminal prosecution. The court 
invalidated the entire provision, declining to sever the 
word "humane" in order to uphold the requirement that 
disposal be "sanitary." See 651 F.2d, at 1211. We affirm 
this judgment. 
Akron contends that the purpose of §1870.16 is simply 
"'to prevent the mindless dumping of aborted fetuses on 
garbage piles.'" Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 
401 F. Supp. 554, 573 {ED Pa 1975) {three-judge court), 
71. 
aff'd mem. sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 u.s. 901 
{1976} . 4 3 It is far from clear, however, that this 
provision has such a limited intent. The phrase "humane 
and sanitary" does, as the Court of Appeals noted, suggest 
a possible intent to "mandate some sort of 'decent burial' 
of an embryo at the earliest stages of formation." 651 
F.2d, at 1211. This uncertainty is fatal in a provision 
that "conditions potential criminal liability on confusing 
and ambiguous criteria." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 
379, 396 {1979}. Because §1870.16 fails to give a 
physician "fair notice that his contemplated conduct is 
43 In Fitzpatrick the District Court accepted 
Pennsylvania's contention that its statute governing the 
"humane" disposal of fetal remains was designed only to 
prevent such "mindless dumping." That decision is 
distinguishable because the statute did not impose 
criminal liability, but merely provided for the 
promulgation of regulations to implement the disposal 
requirement. See 401 F. Supp., at 572-573. 
72. 
forbidden," United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 
(1954), we agree that it violates the Due Process 
Clause. 44 
VIII 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
invalidating those sections of the city of Akron's 
"Regulations of Abortions" ordinance that deal with 
parental consent, informed consent, a twenty-four hour 
waiting period, and the disposal of fetal remains. The 
remaining portion of the judgment, sustaining Akron's 
requirement that all second-trimester abortions be 
44we are not persuaded by Akron's argument that the 
word "humane" should be severed from the statute. The 
purpose underlying the phrase "humane and sanitary" is 
uncertain, and there is no way of determining whether the 
city would have enacted §1870.16 with the word "sanitary" 
alone. Akron remains free, of course, to enact more 
carefully drawn regulations that further its legitimate 
interest in proper disposal of fetal remains. 
73 . 
performed in a hospital, is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
